The result of the United Kingdom’s referendum on EU membership in 2016 is a crisis representative of a crucial threat to the European project – the politicisation of Euroscepticism. For so long, European member states have ambled down the path towards an ‘ever closer union’, but in more recent years this has been challenged by a growing voice of popular dissent. Until recently, European matters tended to be contained largely to the European arena. However, as integration has become increasingly politicised, and radical right-wing populist, single issue parties have contested the ‘elite consensus’ (that more of Europe is a good thing), domestic politics have played a heightened role in attempting to solve European issues. This politicisation of Europe has left incumbents in an uncomfortable situation, as they are forced to mobilise on an issue that they would rather see left off the agenda. Brexit represents the first crisis where band-aid policy solutions that incrementally induce further integration have been halted and a member-state has opted to leave the union. Arguably it is the politicisation of Euroscepticism within Britain that was unique, and unlike previous EU crises, began the process of potential disintegration.
Following a week of Brexit votes at Westminster, we are presented with continued evidence that Eurosceptic views should not be pushed to the side and ridiculed or mocked: this stands for both political and academic communities. Perhaps in May we will see the collapse of British-dominated Eurosceptic parties in the European Parliament, however, we must resist the assumption that Euroscepticism has successfully been contained to just the UK. Movements of this sort are no longer confined to nation states or the fringes of Europe, they operate effectively across borders in transnational networks of opposition. If the UK successfully leaves Europe, it will be an example for Eurosceptic supporters that it is possible to leave the EU and survive – as the case may be, while also waving their national flag and beating their chests in triumph.
We can hope that the UK is a unique case of Euroscepticism, and there certainly is resounding evidence for the link between Euroscepticism and a resurgence of English nationalism, however the growth of radical right parties throughout Europe suggests that this problem is about more than just Britain’s historic indifference towards Europe. The social cleavages exposed (and not created) by the Brexit vote exist in variations throughout Europe and the world, illustrated by the growing rise of populism and radical right-wing parties globally. Radical right parties have increasingly, and successfully, used opposition to the EU as a tactical lever to help move them beyond their traditional anti-immigration/single-issue labelling. While last week’s article urged an increased engagement with everyday politics of Europe, surely it is not too much to expect our representatives to engage with the everyday issues of European citizens. This is particularly relevant with the great success single-issue Eurosceptic parties have had in harnessing non-Europe related issues under the banner of Euroscepticism.
Euroscepticism has dominated discussions of European crises. Two views of the phenomenon have dominated popular and academic discourse on European integration. Firstly, the popular narrative sees Euroscepticism as the expected kink to be worked out in the birth of any new political system – there are and always will be those who disapprove, either in principle or in practice, and we cannot expect the EU to be any different. Unfortunately, there must always be losers in any new system and, politically, it is the perception of this loser that is fundamentally important. The condemnation of Eurosceptics as people who cannot or will not understand the way the world is changing is fuelled by the effective adoption issues important to the disenfranchised population who currently feel ignored by mainstream parties. With regards to Britain’s eurosceptics, one could write for hours on the impact of party realignment for Labour and Conservative voters and their subsequent shift to the waiting arms of more radical right parties like the UK Independence Party (or British National Party in its heyday), however it only serves to highlight the failure of mainstream parties and the danger of a continuing drift towards a centric convergence. Another perspective accords Euroscepticism a higher level of political legitimacy. From this angle, Euroscepticism exists honourably in the spectrum of politics as a struggle; political actors take, and should take, any opportunity to advance their opinion or agendas. These two perceptions have determined the way in which elite responses to Euroscepticism have been formulated.
For a number of years Eurobarometer data has indicated that public support and mistrust of the EU is at a low and, consistently, European policy-makers have been slow to respond. Engaging with the opposition is crucial at any level of politics and indeed central to the democratic process. To continue to ignore the issues facing Eurosceptics would be to do so at the risk of the EU itself. About 390 million European citizens will go to the polls in May, and do so at a time when the EU faces one of its greatest crises to date. The EU is used to having a European Parliament in favour of its supranational system and over the last 35 years it has continued to acquire power. Regretfully, this period might be coming to an end. Eurosceptics are emboldened by the flaws in status quo Europe: the euro does suffer from design flaws; EU migration policies are deeply unpopular; the perceived democratic deficit and, crucially, that the EU is often fuel to the fire of globalisation rather than a protector of everyday citizens. This is not in anyway an attempt to sing the praises of Eurosceptics, but rather a response to the dangerous practise of mainstream parties insisting on continuing with a business as usual approach. In order to effectively address Euroscepticism, it must react to it on every level of European society. In short, Europe needs more politics, more debates and more disagreements. People need real choices and solutions to the issues that really concern them, and mainstream parties must oblige.
Brexit should no longer be a question of who is better at playing the blame game. The onus now falls on politicians and regular EU citizens alike to engage with their ‘other’, opening a dialogue that fosters greater democratic legitimacy for the European project. Euroscepticism has existed since the beginning of the European project (albeit not always under this name) and, for the foreseeable future, it is an issue that is here to stay. It is the politicisation of Euroscepticism that has wreaked havoc in the UK and it’s spread throughout the radical right parties of Europe indicates that it needs to be addressed in Europe and domestically.
by Niamh Saunders – A 1st year Master student in European Governance at the Universities of Konstanz and Utrecht. You can follow her on Twitter here!
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