How to make Europeans stop eating meat ?

Introduction

Will eating animal meat ever become the new smoking? The list of disadvantages of meat consumption is easy to fill: whether you look at the effects on the climate, the environment or even public health, it is hard to defend a diet which includes meat. Even more questionable however, is the fact that animals get slaughtered for consumption on a massive scale: 80 billion per year globally. In addition, the majority of antibiotics which are produced worldwide are not used to cure humans, but to prevent diseases on animal farms. With regard to the impact on the climate, the European agricultural sector is responsible for 10% of the total EU-wide emissions, an amount which is largely formed by livestock, making animal farms responsible for the lion’s share of the agricultural emissions (EEB, 2020). Ruminant animals like cows emit methane, a greenhouse-gas (GHG) with a relatively strong impact on global warming. In addition, we have environmental problems due to intensive farming practices, being one of the causes of the nitrogen crisis in some European states. Lastly, there are the human health impacts: the consumption of processed meat for example, is classified by the International Agency for Research on Cancer as “carcinogenic for humans” (IARC, 2015).

All of these facts are relatively well known, but how much meat do we consume? In 2018, the average European consumed 69.5 kg of meat per year (Guyomard et al. 2021, p. 4). This is higher than the global average and unsustainable with regard to the effects mentioned above. In this article, I want to discuss the different measures the EU has at its disposition to influence consumer- and farming practices. First, I will look to the consumer side. Can our meat consumption be reduced even without interventions? Second, when moving to the production side, I will describe the new measures which are part of the future Common Agricultural Policy, the EU’s flagship policy for the agricultural sector. Can these measures help reduce the impact of meat production on the climate? Third, I want to discuss a last option: could it be viable to continue with our livestock (or pastoral) farming practices, by taking emissions out of the air?

Actual consumption & production

First: are people capable of changing their diets by themselves, without government intervention? As a recent survey pointed out, people in the EU indicate a personal motivation to decrease animal products in their daily diets. The study, undertaken under the Smart Protein project by the organisation ProVeg and funded by the EU, shows that for instance the individual interest in plant based foods is rising (ProVeg, 2021). The sales value of this sector has increased with as much as 49% in the past two years (EVU, 2021). Plant based foods are not the only alternative for eating meat from animals; cultivated meat which can be produced in laboratories is entering the market as well. When imitating cellular processes in a controlled environment, meat can be developed at high efficiency.

This is all good news – but only if the consumption of animal products drops at the same time. When we look at the expected European meat consumption in 2030 for instance, compared to 2020 our consumption will only be reduced slightly. In 2030, Europeans are expected to consume 67.6 kg of meat, compared to the earlier mentioned 69,5 kg per year. (EC, 2020, p. 36). As shown in figure 1 below, taken from the European Commission’s ‘outlook for the agricultural sector’ for the next ten years, we can see that for some meat sectors (such as the poultry and the sheep meat sector), the consumption levels are expected to grow. Even more striking is the fact that the EU is a net exporter when it comes to the production of beef, pig and poultry meat (idem, p. 31-33). In Europe, we therefore produce more meat than we consume, although we still import meat from other countries outside Europe. In 2021, the amount of the EU’s beef production was 6,800 million kilograms – equalling a staggering amount of 23 million animals which were slaughtered in that year (Eurostat, 2022).

Figure 1: meat consumption kilogram per capita EU (2021).

To come back to the results of the ProVeg survey, they are surely interesting, and they are showing an optimistic foresight when it comes to the future of animal product consumption. However, still the majority of 61% of the respondents of the survey indicates to be a omnivore (i.e. eating meat frequently) (ProVeg, 2021, p. 10). In addition, there is reason to be sceptical, because the survey measures the self- reported future behaviour of the respondents, and does not entail direct observations. To indicate that you would like to reduce your meat consumption might be socially desirable, but not necessarily true. Consumer behaviour remains difficult to change as people are situated in their cultural environments and are prone to habits. Eating less meat can therefore be a pledge which falls all to quickly into other ‘new year’s resolutions’.

Price interventions

In the policy toolbox of governments to reduce the consumption levels of specific goods, an obvious possibility is to increase prices. As noted in the ProVeg study, plant-based foods are often more expensive than animal-based foods – which can be a crucial point for consumers to make the switch for a vegetarian diet (2021, p. 9). When buying meat is getting more expensive, the daily choice for consumers in the supermarket for plant-based alternatives will be a lot easier. Like cigarettes in most European countries, meat could be ‘taxed’ out. A first problem however, is the fact that the EU legislator is not competent to undertake policies for the taxation of animal products. Eventual price increases of meat are introduced by the Member States (MS) individually, and are therefore less effective. Regulating the production of animal products in Europe however, is subject to EU regulations (Guyomard et al., 2021, p. 5). Second, a difficulty for a policy that increases European prices on meat, is that the import of cheaper meat from third-countries could rise. European consumption would therefore remain more or less at the same level as before the introduction of the price increase. The risk of a higher import of cheap meat can be alleviated when keeping the current import tariffs at EU level high. For dairy products and meat, the actual Most Favoured Nations tariffs are actually already among the highest compared to other products (Guyomard et al., 2021, p. 5). Another possibility to ensure a ‘level playing field’ between European and non- European meat producers, is given by the recently proposed ‘Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism’ (CBAM). This policy, announced by the Commission in 2021, aims at setting a levy for carbon-intensive products imported from outside the European Union. In that way, the risk of ‘carbon leakage’ is to be avoided, when EU producers shift their production abroad where less stringent and less costly climate policies are in place. To be sure, the Commission’s proposal currently only covers sectors like aluminium and cement (Commission, 2021). Including the meat sector in the CBAM would increase the price of imported meat based on its carbon emissions, thereby equalling the price of meat produced in Europe. Although the CBAM is currently passing the ‘legal pipeline’ (the Council of the EU for instance has recently agreed on its adoption), it will take time before a carbon levy at the European borders will be effectively installed (especially when taking into account the eventual inclusion of the meat sector). Luckily, there is a well-known policy at the European level which can make a great difference with regard to the meat production on a shorter term scale.

The EU policy for agricultural products: the CAP

The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is the best example of the EU’s influence on the production side of the EU’s agricultural sector, regulating for instance the supply of livestock at European farms. As the CAP has recently been reformed, and will enter into force in 2023, the time to follow the new measures which could reduce the consumption of animal products is now. Before discussing the new reforms, it is important to describe the development of the CAP. The CAP was founded in 1962, and it was introduced to ensure and to boost agricultural production in Europe. After the seventies and eighties, which entailed overproduction of certain agricultural commodities like milk, in 1992 the CAP evolved from a policy of ‘product support’ to ‘producer support’ under the so-called MacSharry reforms. Currently, the CAP is constituted of two large pillars: one composed of EU funding, one of funding coming from the Member States. The direct income support for farmers comes from the first pillar, often in the form of subsidies, while the second pillar is designed to develop rural areas in the EU. One of the main critiques of the current CAP is that the direct income support measures are favouring farmers with larger farms; the larger the size of the farm, the larger the amounts of financial aid the farmer could receive (Guyomard et al., 2021, p. 5). This obviously incites farmers to take more livestock. As mentioned, more livestock is directly linked to increasing emissions. The CAP is therefore currently opposing to the ambitions which are recently announced in the ‘European Green Deal’, where the European Commission has announced the ambition to decrease the European GHG emissions by 55% in 2030 compared to 1990 levels. The objectives of the new CAP however, should be contributing to the climate and environmental ambitions of the Green Deal.

One of the large reforms which is expected to align the new CAP with the Green Deal’s objectives, are the introduction of ‘eco-schemes’. These are direct and yearly payments for farmers using environmental friendly methods. From the total budget of the future CAP’s first pillar, 22% should be dedicated to these payments. After the implementation of the new CAP in 2023, the EU Member States will implement the eco-schemes in another large reform of the CAP: the National Strategic Plans (NSP`s). In essence, these NSP’s will consist of how Member States will answer to the CAP’s objectives. The introduction of those plans will allow the Member States more room for manoeuvre; they will be given greater ‘subsidiarity’ in the EU’s agricultural policy. NSP’s can for instance indicate which environmental practices (such as planting more trees on farms) will be rewarded by the eco-schemes, or which specific national agricultural sectors should be prioritised. With the deadline being passed on December 2021, much countries have already submitted their NSP`s, and are waiting for recommendations of the European Commission later this year. The influence of the Commission appears to be resting rather weak however; they are not expected to refuse any NSP, but will only make some suggestions for adjusting them. Despite the limited role of the Commission, it is not a certainty that the NSP’s will be in accordance with the European Green Deal objectives. France for example has received already shortly after its publication of their NSP, disapprovement of the Green Members of the European Parliament, based on concerns of alignment with the Green Deal (Pistorius, 2022). In an assessment report to qualify more draft NSP`s, which were submitted in November 2021, several environmental organisations have found that a large number of the national proposed eco-schemes also fall short of the European environmental objectives (Nyssens et al., 2021, p. 3). The most effective medicine to reduce agricultural GHG emissions for example, reducing the livestock size of farms, seems to be largely ignored by the European countries in their announced plans. Besides financial support for farmers, a possible measure to succeed in a reduction of livestock size is to include a conditionality for farmers with regard to animal density. Every farm could for instance, based on its available agricultural area, receive a maximum of 2 ‘Livestock Units’ (LU) per hectare (Climate Action Network, 2021, p. 15).

CCS to the rescue?

Besides the measures included in the new CAP, the European Commission also follows another possible strategy to make the agricultural sector more climate friendly. In a recently announced Communication they are including the possibility of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) at farm level (Commission, 2021). CCS focuses not on reducing the GHG`s emissions, but at taking emissions out of the air. Under the so-called ‘carbon farming’- initiative, farmers should be incited (following the logic of the ETS system), to capture carbon on their lands. This can be done by improving the management of their land, for instance by planting trees and the restoration of peatlands. The idea is that the sequestration of carbon will become profitable; besides normal agricultural products farmers could now also sell carbon farming credits. The target for 2030 is to have a carbon uptake of -310 Mt CO2 eq. (Commission, 2021, p. 3).

Although the Commission clearly states that the carbon farming practices are only complementary to the mitigation efforts of the EU, the question remains whether this is the most efficient sustainable policy for the agricultural sector. First, carbon uptake and emissions of soils are relatively difficult to estimate; soil emissions might be greater than reported, thereby making the target for 2030 too low (Boot, 2021, p.18). Second, although reforestation is a great tool to capture carbon, trees always have the risk of being incinerated by fires, especially in a warmer climate. This would release the carbon and delete the carbon uptake to zero. Finally, an often reiterated critique for CCS solutions is that it has the potential to divert the focus on mitigation efforts. With regard to agricultural practices, CCS would not incite changes to the current way of keeping livestock. In addition, CSS aims at the negative climate effects of animal farms, but it is not a solution for the environmental and animal welfare problems.

Conclusion

The current intensive and large-scale way of farming with livestock is not in line with the European climate ambitions, and has several other negative effects on the environment, not to forget the slaughtering of the animal themselves. As European consumption regulations are legally speaking much weaker than production regulations, changes to decrease our meat consumption should be made on the supply, rather than the demand side. Although there are several policy proposals at the EU level capable of reducing emissions from the agricultural sector, such as CSS or the CBAM, it seems clear that the most effective way forward is to reduce the livestock size of European farms. Being part of the new Common Agricultural Policy for 2023, the introduction of the eco-schemes are a perfect opportunity to motivate farmers financially to reduce their herd size. Such measures should therefore be included in the NSP’s, before the Commission’s approval in June this year. Although we Europeans might become nostalgic to the pastoral farming practices and the scenic of cows in the meadows, the negative side of our current meat consumption is too large to ignore.

by Tim Draijer

Sources:

Boot, Mary S. (2021). Why the EU’s plan for climate neutrality by 2050 will likely fail. Partnership for

Political integrity. PFPI-EU-Land-Sink-Target-report-Nov-23-2021.pdf

Climate Action Network. (2021). Will CAP Strategic Plans help deliver needed climate action?

European Commission (2020), EU agricultural outlook for markets, income and environment,

2020-2030. European Commission, DG Agriculture and Rural Development, Brussels.

European Commission (2021, December 15th). Communication on Sustainable Carbon Cycles. SWD (2021)450final. com_2021_800_en_0.pdf

European Commision (2021). Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism: Questions and Answers https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_21_3661

European Environmental Bureau (EEB). (2020), A cap for a climate neutral Europe. https://eeb.org/library/a-cap-for-a-climate-neutral-europe/

European Vegetarian Union. (2021). Food sector report from the smart protein project. https://

http://www.euroveg.eu/relevance

Eurostat (2022). Slaughtering in slaughterhouses – annual data https://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do

H. Guyomard, Z. Bouamra-Mechemache, V. Chatellier et al. (2021). Review: Why and how to regulate animal production and consumption: The case of the European Union, Animal, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.animal.2021.100283

Célia Nyssens, Jabier Ruiz, Tatiana Nemcová. (2021) Will CAP eco-schemes be worth their name?

Click to access CAP-report-eco-schemes-assessment-Nov2021.pdf

International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC). (2015). IARC Monographs evaluate

consumption of red meat and processed meat. Press Release No. 240. http://www.iarc.fr/en/media-centre/pr/2015/pdfs/pr240_E.pdf

Pistorius, M. (14 january 2022). French CAP plan prioritises legumes, hedges and carbon farming. https://www.euractiv.com/section/agriculture-food/news/french-cap-plan-prioritises-legumes-hedges-and-carbon-farming/

ProVeg International (November 2021). What consumers want: a survey on European consumerattitudes towards plant-based foods.

A first look at how the Dutch elections will affect the country’s voice in Brussels

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During the general elections on March 17^th, the party of current prime minister Mark Rutte, VVD, became once again the largest in parliament. The liberal D66 party, which has explicitly campaigned with a pro-European message, was one of the biggest winners, becoming the second largest party and practically ensuring themselves a prominent role in the next coalition government. The increase of support for D66, but also the dominance of eurosceptic right-wing parties, has sparked attention from across the bloc, as Germany prepares for its federal elections in September and France for its presidential elections in 2022. Coalition formation is still at an early stage, but what could be some of the factors that will determine the coalition government’s position on EU policy?

With both pro-EU and eurosceptic parties having won seats, the EU will continue to be a polarizing issue. D66 leader and current trade minister, Sigrid Kaag, is not expected to sell her support for a coalition government cheaply, and rather than Rutte, who has signalled he prefers a quick coalition formation, is likely more comfortable with taking her time. The pan-European party Volt managed to obtain three seats, the first in any of the national parliaments within the EU, and it will likely try to influence the discourse by stressing the necessity of European cooperation. A significant increase could also be observed in the eurosceptic bloc, growing from 22 to 28 seats in the 150-seat parliament. Due to their eurosceptic positioning and the prominent position of the D66 in a future coalition, these eurosceptic parties’ influence will likely mostly take place indirectly by influencing the increasingly polarized public discourse.

The Netherlands will remain a net-payer sceptical of deepening EU fiscal integration and interested in keeping member states’ debt under control. However, a change in the country’s positioning in Brussels could take place as D66 could claim control over the Dutch finance ministry rather than the incumbent Christian Democratic leader Wopke Hoekstra. A new role for a state secretary of European affairs could also be (re)introduced, which would signal a more pro-active approach in Europe. A new state secretary for European Affairs, such as French and German counterparts, could serve as an envoy for pro-actively and strategically building coalitions and could help to link the Dutch agenda to a broader European one.

With a predicted 17 parties in parliament, the Dutch political landscape is as fragmented and polarized as it has ever been. Ultimately, the extent the Netherlands will see a different stance on Europe would be decided by the mix of coalition partners. A coalition with the Christian Democratic Appeal party (CDA) would see a degree of continuity on most EU issues, though with a potential for more pro-EU positions on individual files relevant to D66. A coalition with VVD, D66 and the left-wing parties would likely see a more substantial shift towards pro-EU positions being taken. However, whatever coalition materializes, Rutte – who himself has never been supportive of deeper political or fiscal EU integration – would continue to play a key role as prime minister in its execution during European Council meetings.

The Netherlands punches above its weight on the EU stage, and changes to its European stance will be closely watched by both Berlin and Paris. After German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s departure, Rutte will be one of the longest-serving and most experienced leaders at the European Council meetings. His political experience will be tested, having to balance a more powerful D66 coalition partner and eurosceptic voices in parliament. The composition of the next government and what they agree on in the coalition agreement will signal the Hague’s direction within the EU.

This article was written by Maarten Lemstra, a graduate in European Governance from the universities of Konstanz and Utrecht. He is a former research assistant at the EU & Global Affairs unit of the Clingendael Institute and is currently a trainee at a Brussels policy advisory firm.

On Politicisation

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Why does the EU exist? What is the reasoning behind its continued existence? Why does everyone seem to just assume it is a good idea? These are all questions that a friend was asking me over a beer last week. He deplored the fact that this conversation was not taking place. That the idea that the EU is a good thing seems to be an accepted fact. While I disagree with the assumptions that he is making, I understand the feeling that it conveys. It also raises an important question: Politicisation in the EU. Far from being uncontested, I think that there is a vivid debate going on at the highest levels about the Future of the European Union. The obvious example is Brexit and nationalism. Whether the EU should continue to exist in its current form. However you also have a very existant debate within Pro-European parties or between countries. Within parties visions often mirror ethos on a national level. Social democratic parties want more social, and liberal parties like the economy (Simplifications I know). Countries also disagree about priorities and strategy. France and Germany have very different conceptions of how further Integration should happen, and what should be the focus of change. The ongoing negotiations about the next European long term budget shows this well. Different blocs have formed, pushing different agenda’s. However these differences in visions are not visible, or hidden. Some issues might be salient such as the reforms that Macron is trying to push forwards, but in many areas they are more ambiguous. It is what my friend was referring too. Unless you follow European affairs closely, many of these disagreements will be missed. Instead you will hear about the agreements that have been reached. It will thus seem that you always have an agreement on what happens next.

It is important to note that Europe is a system built on compromise. The EU can only exist if everyone gets a piece of the cake. If there were many losers, and countries felt that they were disadvantaged a lot, it would be disentivising them to remain member states. European policy making tries to compromise a lot in order to ensure that everyone gets what they want. It’s technocracy in many ways is what has allowed it to thrive. When Monnet created the system, the aim was to create an endless negotiation. By creating policy which everyone could agree with broadly, but where there were disagreements about details, the focus shifted away from competition and towards cooperation. While there might still be many disagreements about policy making, economics and various industries, at least they will be put to use in a productive way. This has resulted in a very technocratic and compromising system. As everyone wants certain things, compromises have to be made. Member States are also very aware of this. Permanent representation will try to create circumstances in which other member states can agree to legislation that favours them. Whether this is done through concessions, bartering or creating circumstances for other member states to drop their objections without losing face. The seeming agreement at the top of European politics exists thus not because everyone agrees about the Future of the EU, it’s functioning or out an elitist lack of interest. Rather it exists as it is the most sustainable way to keep the Union functioning and the best way to push your own agenda forwards.

If you are not looking for them, you are likely to miss the European debates going on.They are less visible, and happen at different levels. While specific issues are very visible, such as the rise of populism and nationalism, these debates are also often anchored in national dialogue. Issues on which Europe has competence, also tend to be issues that affect citizens less directly. In the past this has been especially true, with the EU focusing on economic affairs which are either hard to grasp or only affect a section of the population. However I believe this is about to change. New European ideas are starting to flow through. It started with the Juncker Commission, but will surely continue with van der Leyen’s one. With big policies such as European defence capabilities and European Climate Change policy gaining in salience, a lot more visibility will be given to European issues, which in turn will also politicise them. Public interest and discourse will create more awareness about them, and thus make differences in positions clearer.

The more politicisation the more EU responsiveness. However the less public support. LSE How politicisation facilitates responsiveness in the European Union

While to a certain extent this might be a good thing, it might also be a danger. When I was in Brussels last month with my master programme, an official told us that it was already harder to cooperate and to achieve compromise. Increasing public salience about issues is important to create a sense of involvement and interest in European affairs, but it will also make compromise harder. As positions become less ambiguous, Member states will find it more difficult to abandon position they have. Concessions made will be clearer and will thus create more entrenchment. While this will likely only happen in high salient issues (I mean how much do you know about regulation of products, even in your own country?), these high salient issues are often important factor in opinion formation. Take the example of migration. Bad management thereof has soured public opinion about the EU at least in part. Migration, being a highly salient issue in many countries, is also one of the areas in which the EU has the most difficulties to find a compromise. While migration might be an extreme, it does show effect of positional entrenchment. This is turn will push the EU towards a more winner/loser model which will he harder to accept for national governments and people alike.

Politicisation of European policy is good, but it also has its problems. Increases in saliency provides for more dialogue and accountability. It also allows European citizens to be more involved in policy making. Yet it also result in policy making being harder. In a way this paradox shows one of the problems of further European integration. Until now, Integration has worked so well as it has been about negative integration (the taking away barriers to trade, and harmonising). Now that Europe is also thinking about ambitious new projects, that have high visibility with people, stronger opinions are going to become more widespread too, endangering the capacity of member states to work with each other. This is also reflected in research. While it shows that increases in politicisation has a lot of benefits, it comes with dangers. Europe thus has to find a proper balance between creating more saliency and not alienating people and governments to the project.

The benefits of increased European policy is that people will relate more to the policy. That you increase the capacity of citizens to feel as if they have influence. The danger is that it becomes harder to compromise. The answer would be to clarify the roles between the different European institutions and use them as best as possible. The European Parliament power in legislation should be strengthened while the Council is allowed to keep its ambiguity. The Parliament should come to represent the needs of the people while the Member States in the council look after their own national interest. A strong start for increasing politicisation of the Parliament is to give it the right of initiative in certain fields. Fields that are of importance to the citizens, but don’t threaten member states. For example regulation of products, agriculture, environmental policy, privacy, etc can become areas where Parliament can gain more initiative. This will allow it to react and interact to citizen actions. The right of petition can then also be entrenched in this system. It could also further be expanded by creating a system such as exists in the British House of Commons now. For example a system could be set up where the current right to petition is integrated together with a right to allow groups of citizens to request a debate in a specific committee.

The aim should be to increase interaction between European citizens and the European parliament, and allow the latter to become proper representatives. With more access, it would create a strengthening of the debate in the European Parliament itself, which will be healthy for the discourse. If policies that are important to citizens are debated more openly, and that enough access exists, than Europe can benefit from the increased saliency.

Conversely, the Council should remain ambiguous and less visible. While it will of course be expected that national governments represent the interests of their people, the council should strive to remain a forum of compromise. Ultimately all institutions will have to agree with one another, but the council should remain more hidden. For this reason, the European parliament should then also not receive the right of initiative in certain fields. Migration, fishing rights and international affairs comes to mind. These are policies where national governments can have a lot more difficulties compromising. An environment should be created in which citizen pressure on European affairs is pushed towards the European Parliament and not their own member states.

Of course this is easier said than done. Ultimately when emotions and feelings run high, pressure groups and activists will try and influence legislation through any means possible. By facilitating access to the European parliament, and giving them more influence over legislation, this can be mitigated to a certain degree. There will always be a competing interest, with people also being represented in National Parliaments. However by making the EP more political, interests of citizens will be better represented. More interaction with citizens is beneficial and a European dialogue on European issues is required. The Council meanwhile can protect national interest, maintain a strong degree of influence over issues that matter to member states and remain a bastion of compromise.

Misha Stocker, Master student in European governance in Utrecht Netherlands

Europe’s banking union: from crisis to a closer union

The past two decades of the European Union have been characterised by crisis after crisis. Each have played a role in shaping our current union and financial crises have, in particular, been significant in transforming existing policies concerning financial markets and institutions. Serious political and economic upsets often occur as the consequence of financial crises. Beginning as a contained issue in a market or institution, it can quickly spread to other agents, often necessitating a swift reaction from policymakers. The direction of this reaction, either towards further integration or disintegration, has been difficult to predict.

Despite the staggering challenges the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was faced with, it has continued to evolve through incremental path-dependent changes. This also held true for the area of banking supervision, until 2012. At a summit meeting in June 2012, the EU adopted policy that shifted the authority for banking supervision. Around the same time, banking rules were harmonised based on legislation that gave more significant and intrusive powers to supervisors than before. Banking governance represents a jealously guarded aspect of national sovereignty, and by no means was a decision taken lightly by member-states. The creation of the Single Supervisory Mechanism for the euro area banking sector is one of the most dramatic and progressive institutional developments of recent years. The responsibility of banking supervision taken at the European level represents a major shift in sovereignty and, as Mario Draghi, ‘the most significant integration step since the Maastricht Treaty’. It must also be noted that, by EU standards, this step in integration was adopted exceptionally quickly. In comparison to the previous slow and incremental evolution, as well as other EMU crisis responses, the fast evolution of the SSM presents a ‘punctuated change’ in the institutional development of the EU.

On 3 November 2013, the Council Regulation establishing the Single Supervisory Mechanism was adopted (SSM). It delegated to the ECB a range of supervisory tasks related to the newly conceived banking union and, perhaps most importantly, it set up the key pillar of the banking union, a common supervisory framework for banks in the euro area. Importantly, the SSM is characterised by supervisory cooperation between European national levels, with the ECB directly supervising significant national banks. In addition, Article 6(5) of SSM Regulation stipulates that it provides oversight over the whole system by monitoring the conduct of supervisors of smaller or ‘less significant’ institutions that remain supervised by national authorities.

It seems that in the area of finance and banking, crises have become almost essential to continuing the process of integration. States only realise, or perhaps are forced into acknowledging, the benefits of closer integration when they are faced with the fear of a collapsing union. This begs the question – bar other crises in our future, how can we foster further integration between member states in a way that is wanted? In the case of the SSM, unprecedented cooperation between EU institutions promoted integration at every stage of the decision-making process. Inter-institution cooperation and bargaining might be the best way forward for these high salience sovereignty issues.

By Niamh Saunders – A 1^st year Master student in European Governance at the Universities of Konstanz and Utrecht.

Inequalities, the EU and the concept of convergence

Inequalities are like misfortunes: they never come alone. When a family is relatively low on the ladder in society regarding income, chances are high its lacking behind as well in education, health and other social aspects. Inequality therefore, is not only an economic or political issue: it appears in different forms.

In this blog, I want to discuss some of the existing European inequalities. I will start by giving a very short moral introduction, describing why I think maintaining high levels of inequality and a stable society at the same time are a challenging combination. Moving to the European perspective, I will mention the possibilities for European policies addressing inequalities. Whereas inequality is not only an economic issue, global wealth and income inequalities are currently very intense. In my blog, I will thereby mainly focus on economic inequalities.

Before starting any discussions on how to deal with inequalities, the first question should be if there is something inherently bad about inequality in general. In my opinion, there is, for at least two reasons. First, with high levels of inequality in a society, it is almost impossible to build or sustain a stable community. When there are large differences between people in a group, it is quite naïve to expect that people would feel connected to each other. Second, inequality in essence means that a majority of the people do not have much resources, while a minority of the people does. As politics is often (perhaps sadly enough) about effective lobbying, a small group of people with a lot of resources could have a disproportional impact on public policy. Democratically speaking, inequality is therefore not very desirable.

After having shortly discussed the broad aspects of inequality, I now move to the European perspective. Among all European crises (Brexit, migration), tackling inequality seems not be the phenomenon that is particularly high on the EU’s agenda. This is not without some reason: average income inequality rates in Europe are very low compared to countries around the world. Income inequality however, is only one side of the economic ‘coin’. Whereas incomes are being relatively even distributed in Europe, wealth (or capital) is much more concentrated. The difference between the two is that income is a flow (the money you get for working), while wealth is a stock (the house you have). As private capital has been growing steadily compared to public capital, wealth inequality has increased in Europe. Moreover, the European crises mentioned above can be viewed as being consequences of inequalities. The Brexit for instance, which was addressed by last week’s blog, could be seen as a long term result of existing inequalities in the UK. Inequality therefore, deserves more European attention; because of higher wealth inequality levels, but also because of the possible long term effects of inequality. As the European countries face comparable challenges regarding wealth inequality, the EU appears to be a logic policy level for addressing this topic. This might be particularly true for existing regional wealth inequalities inside Europe. As European cities (with high levels of wealth) are economically diverging from their corresponding regions, people in those regions might feel more connected to people living in similar circumstances in other European states.

Lastly, the question is how inequality should be tackled at the European level. The EU could be seen mostly as a community bound together by treaties and legislations. Its policies should always be grounded in some sort of legal foundation. As the EU has only shared competence on social policy and limited competence on tax policy, Member States can decide themselves on whether they want to address inequality-issues. The division of competences, however important they are, are luckily not the only base for European policy making. Values and certain ‘commitments’ matter as well. The principle of gender equality for instance, has been a founding value included in the European treaties since 1957. For income and wealth inequalities such legal bases are not so clearly stated. There might be a window of opportunity for tackling these inequalities at the European level however: the concept of convergence. This important concept describes the need for European Member States to grow economically closer to each other. In my opinion, convergence should not only occur between the Member States of the EU, but also between wealth and income levels of the people of the EU. Contents of future EU policies to achieve this economic convergence can be straightforward: whereas inequality is a complex problem, the solutions do not have to be. In essence, solutions could be divided in bottom-up or top-down approaches. Accessible education as a bottom-up way to balance inequalities is often mentioned, by including lower income groups to the ‘ladder of mobility’. A possible top-down solution is also very well known, but obviously less popular: raising taxes. As wealth itself is not limited by borders, capital moves to the EU Member States where the taxes are lowest. Levelling taxes on a European level thereby demotivates this movement of money.

Economic inequalities can be seen as the “defining challenge of our time” (Obama, 2013). High levels of inequality are not only unfair in a democratic sense, they also lead to long term negative consequences. Being a continent where values are sources for policy, EU policy makers should be proactive in addressing and tackling inequalities.

By Tim Draijer – A 1^st year Master student in European Governance at the Universities of Konstanz and Utrecht.

Sources: World Inequaltiy report 2018, EUR-Lex