By Tim Draijer and Maarten Lemstra

INTRODUCTION

Just after the European Parliament elections, two editors of the Europe Ahead blog met up with Prof. dr. Frank Schimmelfennig to discuss the past, present and future of the European Union. Frank Schimmelfennig is a professor in European Politics at the ETH Zurich, one of the leading universities in the world, and is one of the most prominent scholars in the field of European Integration studies.

Reflecting on the European Parliament elections: What do you think of the outcomes of the recent elections of the European Parliament?

My take on it is that the EU has benefited overall from the elections, for instance by the larger turnout which strengthened the overall legitimacy. Inside the European Parliament (EP), the cartel has been broken up, but it did so without weakening the mainstream parties. The loss of the Social Democrats and the European’s People Party have been compensated by wins of the Liberals and the Greens, but this fragmentation of the EP requires more effort to form new coalitions.  

Do you see this fragmentation as a bad thing?

No, I don’t think it is a bad thing, because it mirrors what happens all around Europe. Much of the former issues of the EP have been due to oversized party groups, which were functioning as a large tent for other parties. The conflict with Orban, for instance, can be seen as an opportunity to sharpen a new profile.

How do you think the power of the European Parliament will change after this elections, also in relation with the Spitzenkandidaten process?

The fact is now that for a stable legislative majority inside the EP, you need at least four party groups. There has been a broad empowerment of the EP, but one has to be clear of what the EP can do: it is not the engine of change inside the European Union. As long as you have a blockage in the Council of Ministers, the EP cannot overcome this. Regarding the Spitzenkandidaten process, the principle itself has been established and will be hard to ignore. Furthermore, when it comes to the chances of one of the Spitzenkandidaten, Manfred Weber, he will also need a broader coalition of 4 groups. His chances therefore largely depend on how he finds support from the Liberals and Greens. In addition, he will have to make big promises. What worked well last time was the swift rally inside the EP, as they would not accept any other candidate proposed by Council. The process is more open this time and Weber’s success will depend on the coherence of the EPP and the commitment of the other parties to the Spitzenkandidaten principle.

Personal questions

Why did you choose the field of European politics?

I have been trained as an International Relations scholar specialized in Eastern Europe. When I first started my PhD, I wanted to focus on the Soviet Union. Basically, before I started doing research, the Soviet Union ceased to exist so that I had to find something else. As I wanted to remain in the field of European politics I chose to specialize in Eastern European politics. A big research issue during these years, was how new institutional structures were formed in the new context after the Cold War.

Looking back, are you satisfied with your choice?

Yes. At that time socialization had been understudied, the relatively scarce work on that topic was deeply a-theoretical, therefore I was able to bring some IR tools. I think it worked well, my work on enlargement, conditionality and socialization has been a stepping stone in my career. My interest of becoming a researcher developed during my studies, as I got really fond of theory and methodology.

How have your experiences abroad improved your view of the European project?

For instance. a major advantage of living in Switzerland, is that I can now see the EU from outside, there is a different discourse there than in Germany. The German view of EU is largely affected by its post-war identity, never only as cost-benefit analysis because the European integration is part of German reconstruction after the war. It was a major anchor for democratizing and rehabilitating the country. The Swiss people see the EU as utterly pragmatic, as they already have democracy and wealth, so they feel that they need to integrate only so far as they need. Working in Switzerland was helpful to develop the differentiated integration theory where I was able to look at the EU as a project which can integrate to various degrees, based on a number of factors like wealth and identity.

The Concept of Differentiated Integration

Regarding this concept, is there no danger of cherry picking where MS integrate only in the policy fields they like?

I think there is always an incentive for cherry picking, but I think the EU core is strong enough to prevent that. In the UK negotiations for instance, the EU has had a firmly negotiation position. Bit the same in the case with Switzerland: there is always an incentive to cherry pick, but the EU has made clear that for instance the European internal market comes with obligations, for example by paying some money for cohesion. A big domestic issue is about the institutional framework agreement in Switzerland, but it is a side issue in the rest of Europe. Here I think the market and bargaining power of EU is large enough to prevent cherry picking.

Is there no threat of a large increase in complexity with the concept of differentiated integration?

This danger exists, but I think it’s a trade-off. If you would like to have a ‘clear’ EU, there would be less integration. In addition, the possibility of increasing complexity is not a very big concern for me; when it comes to the institutions the EU has maintained quite a uniform core. For instance, according to some people, it would be best if the EP was differentiated into a normal parliament and a Eurozone parliament: this is not happening I think. Furthermore, a large number of MS are integrated in all policy areas at the ‘highest’ EU policy level, which provides a large numerical core.

What do you think if some MS want to integrate more and more, where others do not?

First of all, if and when the UK leaves, the EU will be more uniformly integrated in any sense. The UK has been the ‘champion of differentiated integration’ for a very long time. Second, as the Brexit will put pressure on smaller MS, that have been hiding behind the UK, to integrate further. In addition, there are strong interests that prevent an overshoot of differentiated integration. Macron for instance, wants to move ahead, where for instance Eastern European countries don’t. France can only differentiate the EU further with Germany, but Germany moderates this as it has important economic ties with the central European countries who are less in favour of more integration. France therefore can not push the agenda alone: all in all, differentiation will be slower.

Regarding the Western Eastern divide: do you think there will be more convergence of characteristics of the Member States, also for instance in the relation between religion and politics?

I think that in order to say something about this topic, one has to really dive into the different national histories. From the perspective of modernization, the eastern European countries have been lagging behind, but secularization is even taking hold of Poland. One instance in which divergence and differentiation are bothersome, however, is fundamental values and the rule of law. Independent institutions have been one of the basic foundations of the EU. In some countries, like Hungary and Poland, however, the preservation of this foundation is under pressure. On the other side, when it comes to the protection of fundamental values in Eastern European countries, we see the rise of the anti-corruption movement, for instance in Romania.

What is your take on the movement of Eastern European youth towards the richer Western European countries?

That is a true dilemma. The EU is about creating freedoms and opening borders, but not to the benefit of everyone. Educated elites of Eastern European countries for instance, have gained a lot from European integration, where other people did not. When those educated, open-minded elites leave their country, they will not be able to affect the political development of their home-countries. Related to this, one can say that right wing populism in countries is not only driven by immigration but also largely by fears of emigration. It is the combination of emigration and immigration that makes populists fight against migration.

The role of the EU outside Europe

How do you see the future of globalisation, and international cooperation?

First of all, I think that the heyday of globalisation is over! What we see now is stagnation, or even slowballisation. We observe stagnation of trade and receding capital movements.This might be a result of the global financial crisis and Trumpian politics as they have put a break on globalization. I think it depends on a lot of developments. While the worst of the financial crisis is over, we have not seen a return on transnational dependence levels which were observed before. As the China and U.S. trade war continues, we now live in a time in which the EU should not only think about how to integrate itself in a globalized world economy, but also how it will hold its place in this worsening economic climate.  

Do you see a leading role of the EU in the field of climate change?

It is one thing what the EU does inside of Europe; here I think it can still do a lot on climate change. But I think that outside Europe, the EU’s potential for a leading role is quite limited. There exist many examples of trendsetter role of the EU: for instance when it comes to consumer rights. However, without the backing of policies on climate change in China and the U.S., I don’t think the EU has a very important role to play in this field. In addition, I think the issue really is here that this problem of climate change is simply to big for the EU to tackle alone, and to move ahead decisively.

In general, do you see the EU as a normative or more as an economic power?

To start, seeing the EU as a normative power is a very 1990s concept; in that time this view couldn’t be blamed, following processes of increasing democratization and integration. In the 21^st century, however, I think the EU lost that normative power during the migration and Euro crisis. Thereby the outside attractiveness of EU as an international cooperation model has also been suffering. Initially, the normative power idea of the EU was that it would be a shining example of a new type of international relations. You might argue that the whole idea has been a bit too rosy a picture. Even in the 1990’s what really made European integration go, was the economy, and not human rights.

Crises in Europe

The media often gives us the impression that there is always a crisis to deal with whereas a majority of people living in Europe are enjoying a good life with more wealth and liberty than ever before, what do you think about this?

I think for the moment the worst is over, people are recovering, and are having a more optimistic view, also of the EU. If you look at the latest eurobarometer, the EU has never been as popular since 1992. It has really rebounded in public opinion well. I think that this crisis narrative still is important, and the famous quote of Jean Monnet

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“Europe will be forged in crises, and will be the sum of the solutions adopted for those crises”

Jean Monnet

is partly vindicated by what happened during the crisis. In retrospect we can clearly see that two of the major projects which the EU has been driving forward in the 1990s, the Euro and Schengen, were really built on very shallow foundations, being really fair weather integration projects. What Jean Monnet said is going to happen because governments have to find a consensus but when a crisis comes they will understand what they have in the EU. They will understand that they will be worse off disintegrating and they are better off fixing the issues. To some extent the Eurozone has done this, not fully, there will be future crisis and there will be future fixes but I think everyone in the Eurozone has understood there is no way of going back and we have to work constructively towards consolidating the eurozone, because the interdepence is so strong. Interestingly this did not happen in the Schengen zone as the interdependence is much lower and the cost of disintegration is lower too. It is like Jean Monnet said, it is the risks of disintegration which actually keep countries moving forward. It is not a deep conviction that we have to build Europe, but it is really a way to solve day to day issues.

That seems like its a positive thing to you, the slow way that the EU has been integrating is through crisis. Is it the right way forward or should the EU also look further ahead rather than just looking at issues on their path at a certain moment?

The argument I just made is in line with this failing forward idea, you build something, it fails, you have a problem, you fix it, not particularly well and you fix it again. It is the old neofunctionalist idea, incrementalism and spillover: it’s all in there. If you ask me, it’s a very costly way, only learning through crisis instead of building the institutions right from the beginning. Just think of the sufferings we could have spared the Greek or the Spanish if we had gotten the institutions right from the beginning,

Recently, Luuk van Middelaar wrote a book about how improvisation plays a major part on the EU level, would you agree with this?

It depends on whether you talk about the EU in normal routine mode or crisis mode. We have long had that technical, incremental development but then when the crisis hits and regimes break down and you need to move into crisis mode in the EU council and improvisation to deal with issues that regular policy routines can not deal with. I think for me this is not a fundamental distinction.

Democracy and the EU

What do you think about creating some sort of a stronger link between national parliaments and European policy making to stop national parliaments from saying “everything good is because of us, everything bad is because of them”?

It is not only what national parliaments do, it is also what national governments do too. I mean, we have to be very clear of the tradeoffs that this has. On the one hand it would give national parliaments a stake in EU politics, and I think there are many MS where this is underdeveloped, even though there are member states this is very well developed and also functions rather well. But if it goes to the point that national parliaments obtain a veto in EU policy making it would basically lead to a paralysis Just think of the eurozone crisis with every national parliament having a veto on the rescue measures, the Eurozone would have fallen apart. National parliaments are often more Eurosceptic than national governments and they are also keener on keeping national positions which governments in negotiations have to find compromises on. One has to be careful what to wish for.

What is often criticized is that you can only vote inside the country on national parties during European Parliament elections, would it be good to vote for European parliamentarians as well, to have transnational lists?

Yes, I think that would be a good idea, and I was deeply disappointed that the European Parliament itself said we would not have it. I think in the very beginning I think that it is more something that cosmopolitan elites are fond of, but I think it will create a dynamic. It will not mean that transnational lists will actually take over, but having this opportunity would be very nice and of course both the European Council and national parties will be very much against it. National parties want to keep their control over national parliamentarians, it will be a difficult fight but it should definitely be something that the European Parliament should push for. I would have expected the European Council to fight against this, but I was disappointed that some in the European Parliament actually joined this resistance. And what we of course also need to have is a right for legislative initiative for the Parliament.

Theorising about reality

There exist many lenses to explain EU integration. How do we deal with this plurality of theoretical perspectives?

I think it makes our perspectives on the European Union a lot richer if we keep this theoretical pluralism and the fact that the theoretical pluralism has survived also tells you that there is no single theory that explains everything. Of course that shouldn’t produce an attitude of “anything goes”. I think that in each of the cases we have to test theories quite rigorously and we have to really make an effort to see which theory gives us the best handle on specific cases or patterns. I think that the EU and EU integration is such a complex and multifaceted process that a single theory will not capture everything and it should not, because if a theory captures everything it also captures nothing.

Is there a strong enough link between the insights professors like you find on what is the best way to move forward and the real integration taking place in the EU?

I don’t see myself in the business of making recommendations on how the EU should move forwards…

The policy makers reading this blog will be very disappointed to hear…

Haha, yes but what we as academics should focus on first and foremost is providing sound explanations of what has happened, you can only build sound recommendations for the future if you have a very good understanding of how things have happened in the past and this is where I see my role as academic, provide to the extent possible methodologically rigorous analysis of processes of European integration, also testing causal inferences of policies that work or don’t work also in order to say “be careful, this might be a normatively desirable policy but there are many issues with how it will be put into practice.”

Brexit

People often blame Theresa May for messing things up, but too what extent has she been given a poisoned chalice? To what extent is the messup of Brexit blameable on Theresa May as a person and too which extent on the structural condition of her negotiating position which was terrible.

I read a quote a long time ago, from some British parliamentarian which I thought was fitting, “It is very difficult to see how anyone else but Theresa May should really have provided a smooth ride to brexit, but it is also difficult to see how anyone could have messed it up any more badly than she did.” I think it has always been a very difficult negotiation from the very beginning because there have been too many illusions on the side of the brexiteers of what would be possible in the negotiations with the EU. I also think that Theresa May has made it even worse by formulating too strong red lines from the beginning and not being flexible on exploring issues, on alternative coalitions and alternative ways of brexit until it was basically too late and the camps were too entrenched.

How negative are you about a no-deal scenario, which is getting more likely by the day?

If there is anything that the House of Commons (HoC) can agree upon it is that we will not have a no-deal, it does not have a positive agenda but it is very strong on avoiding this negative outcome. As long as you don’t have a second referendum or new elections, but the same constellation in the house of commons I think it will do all it can to prevent the no-deal scenario. We would have to wait for either fresh-elections or a new referendum to see where this is moving. If it was going to happen, all models that we have predict that a no-deal Brexit will be the solution that does the most harm to the UK. This is also why we have this anti-Brexit coalition in the HoC.

The future of the EU

How would you think the EU will develop over the coming years?

Looking back on the last twenty years what we have seen in EU integration is a huge expansion of policies and members, it’s a huge process of opening up borders and what we are now in is a phase of correction, consolidation, contraction, where the focus will be on consolidating what we have rather than moving ahead. It is a bit like breathing in and breathing out. The post-cold war era is one in which the EU has expanded in all kinds of different directions and in a certain way it has over-extended, gone too far. The shallow foundations have been revealed in these crises, so what we will see is a period in which I don’t think the internal boundaries of the EU will be renationalized but I think that we will see a process in which the external boundaries of the EU will be consolidated. We will not see major enlargement. We will see a hardening of Europe’s borders, more emphasis on border protection. This is the one thing that mainstream parties and populists can agree on, a kind of a common agenda: we have to safeguard the common borders and curb migration. We will not open up further towards non-member states, that is going to be the movement in which the EU is going.

Breathing in and breathing out made me think of the standard economic view of how different economies develop, which also occurs with a sinus curve, how do you see the future, is it like this curve, sometimes expanding and sometimes consolidating, but with an upward trajectory?

I mean, if you look back at the history of EU integration it has started really small, it has ran into a period of stagnation in the 60 and 70s, freed itself from that stagnation by opening up hugely towards the outside world, integrating with the globalizing world economy and enlarging into new member states. I think now is on the agenda is not a period of retrenchment but a period of consolidation and strengthening the foundations. Making the EU ready for the next step. For now I think a lot of work will be put in and has to be put in consolidating the institutions and correcting some of the overstretch.

Are these future challenges not something which requires more Europe. What would you say to those who say “we need to integrate more”?

In certain areas the EU needs to move ahead, but this is not the current mood now. I think it would also be wise for the next 5 years to say “lets consolidate what we have, let’s prevent disintegrating and moving back”. There are many good signs: even many right-wing populist parties understand, that calling for exit, calling for the disruption or the abandoning of the EU is not popular with the people, will not help the MS, some Dutch parties are behind the learning curve. They will learn it the hard way, so I think that the EU is on a very good path to consolidate, also to make the sceptics part of the system, rather than forces for exit. Also Macron’s motto “the Europe that protects” is very much in line with where the EU needs to go. Of course there will be these cyclical changes at some point, there will be some point like in the 1980s where people will understand that too much protection, too much consolidation will also limit the opportunities that the EU will have but I think this is something for the future, first of all what we see is more effort in consolidation.

Personal advice

As a last question, do you have any advice, perhaps personal, for students in this field or researchers living in the EU?

Benefit from the opportunities, see what you have, engage with the EU and with elections. Many bad decisions have been taken because young educated people have not bothered to vote or not bothered to engage and I think it is quite clear that these people benefit from the EU the most and would also lose the most if they leave their votes to others.

By Tim Draijer & Maarten Lemstra – 1^st year Master students in European Governance at the Universities of Konstanz and Utrecht.