During the general elections on March 17th, the party of current prime minister Mark Rutte, VVD, became once again the largest in parliament. The liberal D66 party, which has explicitly campaigned with a pro-European message, was one of the biggest winners, becoming the second largest party and practically ensuring themselves a prominent role in the next coalition government. The increase of support for D66, but also the dominance of eurosceptic right-wing parties, has sparked attention from across the bloc, as Germany prepares for its federal elections in September and France for its presidential elections in 2022. Coalition formation is still at an early stage, but what could be some of the factors that will determine the coalition government’s position on EU policy?
With both pro-EU and eurosceptic parties having won seats, the EU will continue to be a polarizing issue. D66 leader and current trade minister, Sigrid Kaag, is not expected to sell her support for a coalition government cheaply, and rather than Rutte, who has signalled he prefers a quick coalition formation, is likely more comfortable with taking her time. The pan-European party Volt managed to obtain three seats, the first in any of the national parliaments within the EU, and it will likely try to influence the discourse by stressing the necessity of European cooperation. A significant increase could also be observed in the eurosceptic bloc, growing from 22 to 28 seats in the 150-seat parliament. Due to their eurosceptic positioning and the prominent position of the D66 in a future coalition, these eurosceptic parties’ influence will likely mostly take place indirectly by influencing the increasingly polarized public discourse.
The Netherlands will remain a net-payer sceptical of deepening EU fiscal integration and interested in keeping member states’ debt under control. However, a change in the country’s positioning in Brussels could take place as D66 could claim control over the Dutch finance ministry rather than the incumbent Christian Democratic leader Wopke Hoekstra. A new role for a state secretary of European affairs could also be (re)introduced, which would signal a more pro-active approach in Europe. A new state secretary for European Affairs, such as French and German counterparts, could serve as an envoy for pro-actively and strategically building coalitions and could help to link the Dutch agenda to a broader European one.
With a predicted 17 parties in parliament, the Dutch political landscape is as fragmented and polarized as it has ever been. Ultimately, the extent the Netherlands will see a different stance on Europe would be decided by the mix of coalition partners. A coalition with the Christian Democratic Appeal party (CDA) would see a degree of continuity on most EU issues, though with a potential for more pro-EU positions on individual files relevant to D66. A coalition with VVD, D66 and the left-wing parties would likely see a more substantial shift towards pro-EU positions being taken. However, whatever coalition materializes, Rutte – who himself has never been supportive of deeper political or fiscal EU integration – would continue to play a key role as prime minister in its execution during European Council meetings.
The Netherlands punches above its weight on the EU stage, and changes to its European stance will be closely watched by both Berlin and Paris. After German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s departure, Rutte will be one of the longest-serving and most experienced leaders at the European Council meetings. His political experience will be tested, having to balance a more powerful D66 coalition partner and eurosceptic voices in parliament. The composition of the next government and what they agree on in the coalition agreement will signal the Hague’s direction within the EU.
This article was written by Maarten Lemstra, a graduate in European Governance from the universities of Konstanz and Utrecht. He is a former research assistant at the EU & Global Affairs unit of the Clingendael Institute and is currently a trainee at a Brussels policy advisory firm.
Overcoming the current COVID-19 crisis is but the beginning of the many challenges that await the European Union in the coming decades. Various challenges in the field of climate change, technological transition, ageing demography and public health will have to be tackled collectively. A united Europe, capable of acting strategically and proactively to defend shared values and principles is crucial to achieve all these challenges. A divided and disunited Europe on the other hand would be easy prey for other world-powers on the rise such as China. But do we still share the same liberal values upon which the European Union was founded? In this article, I hope to show how through the rot of political corruption democracy is decaying within the EU which can prevent the EU as a whole from acting based on its founding values.
Today is a moment of reflection. The current COVID-19 crisis is not only changing the world, but it is also making us realize how much the world has already changed when we were not paying attention. As noted in a study by the Hoover Institute, democracy has deteriorated worldwide since 2006 with more countries losing democratic freedoms than gaining them, reversing the pattern which we saw following the end of the Cold war. [1] When we take a global perspective, we see that the rise of illiberal world-powers who try to spread their autocratic values necessitates the need for the defenders of democracy to intensify their efforts. In the global fight for values such as liberal democracy, the rule of law and human rights, a united Europe could stand side by side with the upcoming Biden administration to forge a global alliance of democracies against those who seek illiberal autocracy. At first glance, the current Commission seems to be aware of the need to project shared European values, which is reflected in the fact that Von der Leyen has branded her European Commission as a “geopolitical” one. But those attempts to project geopolitical prowess abroad fail when at home liberal and illiberal EU member states are growing increasingly apart from each other and disagree what those shared European values are. Effective EU external action relies on sharing the same goals, principles and values, namely those embedded in Article 2 of the Treaty on the European Union.[2] Only by combatting the structural roots of the current disunity, which can be found in the rise of illiberal governments in certain EU member states who degrade political checks and balances to empower themselves, will the EU be able to find the unity it needs to promote democracy, the rule of law, and level playing fields in the wider world. To project strength abroad, the EU must renew its democracy within. Only if the decay of democracy within the EU is brought to a halt by stopping the political elites who seek to capture their states for their own political ends, will the EU be able to grow into the geopolitical player it wants and needs to be.
The decay of the rule of law as a symptom of decaying democracy
The EU has been founded on respect for the rule of law, and its continued success depends on whether member states can trust each other to respect the rule of law. Such mutual trust is under pressure from the deteriorating democracy and rule of law in increasingly illiberal EU member states. The attacks on the rule of law are symptoms of a broader attack on the notion that institutions should exist to constrain executive power and that there should be a separation of powers. Take Hungary, for example, where Victor Orbán and the ruling party Fidesz are extending their own power at the expense of equal and fair democracy. According to the recent Global Party Survey, Fidesz scores incredibly high in undermining liberal democracy and opposing democratic checks and balances.[3] While EU funds are being misused to reward supporters, control of the media is being used to keep a de facto one-party state in power.[4] The decline of the rule of law serves to enrich those in power and continue the situation in which the democratic level playing field is disturbed so political elites can continue to cling to power. Independent institutions are hollowed out by partisan political attacks, so as to strengthen those in the executive and weaken constraints on power. A politics based on corruption, clientelism and cronyism such as increasingly found in certain Eastern European countries does not give incentives to politicians to care about providing the best public policy to all, but instead makes politics about serving the interests of patrons and specific groups of supporters in society which are needed for them to hold on to power. It’s a mistake to equate the interests of a corrupt political elite with the country’s interests as a whole. While the interests of all citizens of Hungary would be served by the rule of law, fair elections and independent courts, that is not the case for the illiberal elites who are currently in power. Cultural issues and migrants serve as the perfect distraction and scapegoat for these populists to prevent the focus from lying on their own kleptocracy and corruption. While the citizens of Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria take to the streets to protest political corruption in their countries, the situation’s seriousness has not yielded the decisive response needed in many European capitals or in Brussels.
The Fidesz party scores high… in trying to subvert liberal democracy, according to this Global Party Survey.
The EU’s Authoritarian Equilibrium
In a recent article, Daniel Kelemen has argued that despite the EU’s professed commitment to the rule of law and liberal democracy, it has also at the same time been a hospitable environment in which state capture and autocratic backsliding could emerge in the form of a politically stable “authoritarian equilibrium.[5] By only focussing on the European Union as a project of liberal democracy, many have not paid attention to how the EU could inadvertently be conducive to democratic decay. First of all, Kelemen argues that protection from European political party families and an ingrained reluctance to interfere in domestic politics of member states, especially on Germany’s side, has helped protect autocrats from EU intervention. Hungary’s leader Orbán and Serbian leader Vučić are all members of the EPP, a leading European political centre-right political party, which has granted a certain level of European protection from their state capture. However, it should be noted that this protection is not limitless, and within the EPP some voices have called for Orban’s expulsion. While certain European political party families have more problems than others, not a single one is completely free of any example: there can be no exception for parties who do not respect the founding values of the European Union. Governance of the European Union is influenced by principles of subsidiarity, national sovereignty and an assumption that countries will act in “mutual and sincere cooperation” (Art TEU 4(3)). Therefore, interference in domestic backsliding is complicated and made even more difficult because a potential TEU art. 7 procedure, against member states who engage in “serious and persistent” breaches of art 2. TEU values require unanimity and can thus lead to Hungary and Poland protecting each other with a veto.
Secondly, Kelemen argues that EU funding, in the form of cohesion and regional funds, helps sustain autocrats. By increasing control over the state, political elites can control these financial flows of EU funding and steer them into the direction of their clientelist networks. In the same way that oil funds allow autocrats to remain in power without making reforms to their political or economic systems, EU funds can be used to obtain control in illiberal EU member states. EU funds to Hungary, which were not made conditional on the rule of law, were able to support its autocratic regimes either directly, or by freeing up national funds that can be used in that fashion.
Thirdly and lastly, Kelemen identifies that the European free movement allows dissatisfied citizens to move away. In Hungary, this was even promoted as a strategy to get rid of critical voices in society. Over the last ten years, Hungary ranks highest in the EU of young people leaving the country. While it is understandable that so many young people choose to exit a corrupt system with little economic opportunities, it also means that those who remain have an increasingly difficult time to fight back against autocratic elites.
(Dis)united external EU Policy
When looking at a prime example of EU external action, EU enlargement policy, it is clear how the projection of liberal European values around democracy and the rule of law to countries outside the EU is made more difficult by increasingly illiberal member states. EU enlargement policy is one of the Hungarian government’s main priorities. Hungary wants to pursue an EU accession policy in the Western Balkans at a rapid pace and is a vital partner of the Serbian leader Aleksandar Vučić, who now governs Serbia without any real opposition in parliament.[6] The Serbian case is a clear example of the damage that the political use of government powers can do to the trias politica, checks and balances and the state of democracy in general.[7] The Bulgarian government’s recent veto to open negotiations with North-Macedonia over a nationalistic cultural issue, even though the new PM Zaev is engaging in bona fides EU reform damages the accession process. Balkan leaders such as Zaev who are willing to engage in large scale anti-corruption and rule of law reform should be the actors the EU is most willing to support. Instead, the Bulgarian veto sends the signal that political leaders who are eager to make such liberal reforms are not rewarded by progress, which is the opposite of what merit-based EU conditionality should be about. The EU could theoretically put a lot of pressure on increasingly autocratic countries in South-Eastern Europe but is being held back by countries within the EU such as Hungary. In essence, the problem is this: it is simply not in the interests of illiberal countries where democracy is in decay, and the rule of law is under attack to defend liberal values outside the EU. The fact that EU external action is based on unanimity ensures that only lowest common denominator policies can be agreed to, which are ineffective in standing up for liberal democracy. The rule of law crisis in the EU’s near neighbourhood and within the Union itself is not separate but intrinsically intertwined. If due to internal divisions the EU is unable to promote democracy and the rule of law in its closest neighbourhood where its influence is largest then how can we expect it to fight for liberal democratic values in countries further away?
Turning the tide of decaying democracy in EU member states
What, then, can the EU do to turn the tide of such illiberalism and democratic decay? Should the EU not respect the sovereignty of illiberal member states? If there was a level democratic playing field, the people themselves would be able to vote such illiberal leaders out of office. The larger problem of rule of law decline, which does not get the attention it deserves, is that improper control over the allocation of government jobs or control over the media can be used to distort a fair democratic playing field. There are still elections in such competitive authoritarian regimes, but those in power start with an advantage that is difficult for the opposition to overcome.[8] Due to Hungary’s voting system, 53% of votes in the 2010 elections yielded a 2/3 majority in parliament.[9] All small advantages which can be gained from an unequal democratic playing field, even if they seem small, can amount to a much more comfortable position in such “winner takes all’-systems.
So, what can be done? Firstly, all European political families, starting with, but not limited to the EPP, should stop supporting political parties such as Fidesz that do not respect common European values. Consistent condemnation of political corruption and the decay of the rule of law must happen precisely when it takes place within such political families’ ranks. It is important to note that Fidesz explicitly tries to frame the current rule of law conditionality on the EU budget as a political attack by actors affiliated with Soros to force migrants onto Hungary. It is most definitely not, of course, but it remains important to not step into the frames and narratives of Orbán ‘s spin-doctors. Furthermore, the European Commission cannot wait any longer, but as guardian of the European treaties, it must use all the means at its disposal to stop the deterioration and decay of democracy and the rule of law. It has an extensive rule of law toolbox at its disposal, but the Hungarian-Polish threat of legislative deadlock has meant it has used it only very sparingly. It should also be the European member states themselves who should not turn a blind eye when illiberalism and deterioration of the rule of law take place in another EU Member State. Article 259 TFEU allows member states to bring other member states to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) if they fail to meet a treaty obligation and upholding the rule of law could be argued to be such an obligation. Supported by the Council, the Commission would feel strengthened to act and initiate additional actions against actors who seek to disturb democracy in Europe.
Next, strong rule of law conditionality linked to the EU budget is important to ensure that EU funds are not used to strengthen illiberal actors. Young people moving away because there are no economic opportunities for them, or that these opportunities are given away based on loyalty to the ruling party ensure that there is no-one left to fight for liberal democracy. The EU budget contains various instruments which can be mobilized to help young people who are especially economically vulnerable during a pandemic. However, we should not assume that this mechanism alone will fix all our problems. The recently announced rule of law mechanism agreed to in the budget talks is a good first step, but due to its long implementation time, it’s unsure whether it can prevent the elections in Hungary from being stolen in 2022. At the same time that negotiations on this mechanism succeeded, the Polish state-run oil company PKN Orlen bought up Polska press, the largest private media company currently under German control.[10] The Polish government obtaining ownership over previously independent media is a worrying sign in one of Europe’s largest member states and reminds us that a broad, comprehensive focus is required to uphold democracy in all EU member states. In the short-term, it is understandable that the Commission prefers to not endanger its policy agenda with going after rogue member states. However, it is precisely such member states gone rogue which are a big danger to a European Union founded on mutual respect for the rule of law. Furthermore, the European Parliament is also perfectly situated to represent the interest of the citizens of Europe and demand that level democratic playing fields are restored, both on a European level, but especially within illiberal member states themselves. The European Parliament should pay attention especially to the position and rights of Hungarian citizens, civil society and members of opposition parties as these are the primary actors in the fight for the rule of law in Hungary. It’s not surprising that Orbán downplays the Parliament’s role and hopes for an EU run through backroom deals at European Council meetings: it’s because he knows that this institution has the interest of the citizens of Europe at heart and not his own. Rule of law minded governments such as the Netherlands should actively seek to cooperate with the European Parliament to place its own interests in a broader European agenda to revitalize democracy across the EU and abroad. It must be recognized that the inaction of powerful western European member states such as Germany has allowed the political corruption and the decaying democracy we now see to fester: now it is time for these member states to fix the mess they allowed to take root. Lastly, the EU’s highest court, the European Court of Justice can force member states to adhere to the EU legal order of which the rule of law is a central part. It is unacceptable that there are still judgements of the ECJ left unenforced by certain illiberal member states. For example, the ECJ found that the Hungarian law on the prohibition of foreign funding for NGO’s did not comply with EU law, but the law is still in place since the judgement of 18 June (C-78/18). The unenforcement of such judgements cannot be tolerated, and should also have adverse financial consequences, such as fines or halting EU funds. Especially when it concerns civil society which is needed to act as a watch-dog on Orban’s abuses of power.
Ultimately, regimes such as that of Orbán know two main weaknesses. Firstly, they are heavily reliant on control over the media to influence the domestic population. A concentrated effort to increase the plurality of independent media can deal a heavy blow to the control that state capture regimes have. Secondly, the loyalty of the supporters of these regimes relies on the extent that the ruling party can provide them with material benefits and otherwise use their state powers for electoral gain: without access to government powers and funds, the support for Orbán & co will diminish significantly. Instead of a narrow focus on the rule of law, it should never be forgotten that the purpose of these measures should be the creation of a level democratic playing field in which domestic actors can be sure of free and fair elections.
Renewing trust in a union based on the rule of law
Stopping the democratic decline and the rise of illiberal Member States is of enormous importance for the EU’s survival as a union which defends liberal values worldwide. The fact that not all EU member states are certain of (deserving) an invitation to Biden’s world summit of democracies in 2021 should serve as a wake-up call for all EU leaders and politicians who until now seemingly took liberal democracy in all EU member states for granted. In an interview with Politico, Jake Sullivan, the upcoming National Security advisor for Joe Biden has said that the Biden administration plans to “to rally our allies to combat corruption and kleptocracy, and to hold systems of authoritarian capitalism accountable for greater transparency and participation in a rules-based system.”[11] To tackle such corruption and kleptocracy outside of the EU’s borders, we will need to fix the broken glass within the EU. Taking on the fight against corruption, kleptocracy and authoritarian regimes together with international partners such as the US will increase the EU’s potential to act more autonomously on the world stage in the long run. It’s no surprise that calls for “strategic autonomy” that seek to sever age-old transatlantic ties were welcomed in China: they would benefit from a divided EU-US alliance, which we should therefore strengthen instead.
The interdependence and interconnectedness of the EU means that countries within the EU will only flourish if the EU as a whole can flourish. That, in turn, is only possible as a union based on certain shared values: without independent institutions and the rule of law, the EU will not last as a union defending liberal values world-wide in the long run. Removing illiberal leaders can only be done at the ballot box, which is why the EU should not narrowly focus on the rule of law as a threat to the EU’s financial interests, but rather see the decline of the rule of law as a symptom of democracies in decay. Restoring level democratic playing fields in all EU member states is the only way to ensure that the EU won’t be kept hostage by autocratic elites who continue to cling to power. The next Hungarian elections will feature six opposition parties who have unified to tackle Orbán’s party: their success depends on how fair the conditions of the next elections in 2022 will be.[12] Even after (and if) illiberal and corrupt government heads are ousted from power, differences of opinion may persist about the common direction of external European policies. It will always take effort and diplomacy to get all countries looking in the same direction. However, standing firm in the world arena requires the foundation to be based on democracy, the rule of law, and human rights. Allowing that foundation to be damaged through the rot of political corruption damages the EU’s capacity to project its values and interests abroad. Resolving the EU’s internal problems concerning illiberal democracies would enable the EU to regain its self-confidence and unity and ultimately re-engage in the upcoming global struggle to defend and uphold a multilateral rule-based global order based on democratic values.
This article was written by Maarten Lemstra, a graduate in European Governance from the universities of Konstanz and Utrecht. He is a former research assistant at the EU & Global Affairs unit of the Clingendael Institute and is currently a trainee at a Brussels policy advisory firm. His work focuses on EU external affairs, rule of law and democracy promotion.
[2]Art 2 TEU: “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities”
[5] Kelemen, R. Daniel (2020): The European Union’s authoritarian equilibrium. In Journal of European Public Policy 27 (3), pp. 481. DOI: 10.1080/13501763.2020.1712455.
[7] M. Lemstra, (2020, September). ‘The destructive effects of state capture in the Western Balkans. EU enlargement undermined’, Clingendael Policy Brief, https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/ files/2020-09/Policy_brief_Undermining_EU_ enlargement_Western_Balkans_September_2020. pdf.
[8] Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan A. Way. 2010. Competitive Authoritarianism. Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Innovations in the field of blockchain are fast-paced and have the potential to transform the way we use the internet, digital services and organise our economic governance. Blockchain is mostly known for providing the basis for Bitcoin, it is in fact broader and more versatile. As a decentralised ledger technology (DLT), blockchain enables a network to reach agreement on, and permanently record information and transactions. Smart contracts are one of the ground-breaking uses of blockchain, which has the potential of removing third-party intermediaries and reducing transaction costs. Smart contracts facilitate the interaction of two parties based on whatever terms they have agreed on and put into code. However, as of now these smart contracts find themselves in EU legal limbo For its full potential to be harvested, the EU’s DSM (Digital Single Market) strategy needs to reinforce the legal certainty surrounding these smart-contracts. There therefore exists a clear need for a clear legal framework on smart contracts. With legal certainty, the EU can be a leader in smart contract technologies and the transaction cost reductions they bring with them. Without legal certainty, new ideas will not be pursued for fear of legal challenge, liability and uncertainty.
Why is legal certainty for blockchain and smart contracts specifically a matter of importance in the first place? First of all, legal certainty has been recognised as a key general principle of European Law guaranteeing that the law must be certain, clear and precise. It is also intrinsically important to the rule of law and the protection against arbitrary state power. Secondly, legal certainty helps markets properly function by reducing risk costs stemming from the uncertainty around legal outcomes. While having to obey the law might also impose some costs, the fact that legal certainty will help convince actors to engage in innovative activity outweighs these costs. Third of all, there exists the risk of legal fragmentation across national rather than European guidelines on smart contracts, hampering potential, if the EU fails to deliver on a standardised approach .
Two main problems stand out with regards to smart contracts: their legal enforceability and problems relating to jurisdiction. Blockchains do not recognise borders, but if the smart contract resembles a legally binding contract then it will still be bound by the law. Disputes can and will arise, for example from poorly drafted provisions or when the smart contract executes in a way not intended by one of the signatories. Which jurisdiction then becomes applicable? As of now the most important EU instrument dealing with international contracts is the Rome I regulation (593/2008). This regulation does not rely on the “place of formation or performance to determine the applicable law” but instead places high values on the choice of the draftees themselves and in absence of that of their habitual place of residence. As mentioned before, a smart contract does not necessarily have to be a legally binding agreement, which is why EU wide clarity on the formal requirements which smart contracts need to fulfil in order to be legally binding are so important. Lastly, we should not shy away from using the blockchain itself to help provide conflict resolution mechanisms which enhance the legal certainty in moments of dispute. Arbitral clauses with automatic enforcement mechanisms can help limit the circumstances in which intervention by law is necessary. Smart contracts and formal legal contracts can also be combined, for example where if smart contracts lead to obligations under private law, an additional document in language and not code could be registered on the blockchain as well. Such built-in dispute resolution mechanisms have large potential and R&D into mechanisms adding to the legal certainty of smart contracts should be supported.
The EU should not wait with providing legal clarity on the position of Blockchain and smart contracts. Blockchain and smart contracts are in a crucial state of development in which the rules governing these technologies are shaped rapidly. The EU could act as a norm setter on an international level, shaping whether these contracts will be used in the future based on EU acquis and values. By providing legal clarity on smart contracts on an EU level, national approaches are harmonised and contradictory legal frameworks are avoided. While the idea behind smart contracts and its potential for reducing transaction costs is appealing, much work is still to be done over the coming years to make this technology ready for mass-adoption. Fostering innovation of smart contracts requires an active approach on behalf of the Commission, providing legal certainty through an EU-wide and harmonised legal framework, unleashing the potential within properly managed smart(er) contracts.
This article is written by Maarten Lemstra, a second year master student in European Governance at the University of Utrecht
“I am proud of what we have achieved together with the national parliaments. The political dialogue both contributes to raising awareness on European issues in national parliaments and to give the Commission a better view of the national political landscapes. This brings Europe a step closer to its citizens.”
Commission President José Manuel Barroso, 2009
National parliaments have two main reasons to be involved in the EU legislative process. First, national legislators are the ones in charge of implementing EU directives in the national legal order. Second and most importantly, members of parliaments are supposed to represent their citizens. Involving national representatives in the decision-making at the EU level was, therefore, perceived as a possible solution against the democratic crisis of European Institutions. The more the EU was integrating, the more legislative powers were passed from the national to the EU level. Thus, national legislators were described as the “victims” of integration.
In the 2000’, the then president of the commission, Manuel Barroso, engaged himself to better involve national parliaments in the policy-making process at the European level. One of the most visible actions was in 2006 when he announced the creation of a substantive political dialogue. It gives the possibility for national parliaments to send opinions to the Commission on any documents produced by the institutions, especially on EU legislation drafts. The Political Dialogue impose on EU institutions to send any documents to national parliaments. Today, this process is simplified via the platform [find name again]. National chambers have the possibility to send opinions on any of those documents. Yet, the Commission has no obligation to consider those opinions. This process has no binding effect.
Another important tool for involvement of National Parliaments in EU legislation is the Early Warning System. It was established in 2009 by the Lisbon treaty. Contrary to the political dialogue, the EWS is instituted in the EU treaties and have a legally binding effect. The early warning system is reserved to the control of subsidiarity. When national parliaments consider than the legislative proposal violate the subsidiarity principle. Those specific communications from national parliaments to the EU Commission concerning the control of the subsidiarity principle are named ‘reasoned opinion’. When a certain number of reasoned opinions are sent on a same legislation draft, the Commission has an obligation to give further justification about its draft or should modify it. Once the threshold is reached, it starts a procedure call “the yellow card”. So far 3 yellow cards have been launched since 2009. Yet none lead to the revision of the Commission proposal.
Nevertheless, these communications between national parliaments and the EU legislative process raised come questions. The first question concerns the substantive ability of national parliaments to influence EU legislation. None of the 3 “yellow cards’ procedures led to a modification of the EU legislative draft. Or at least the commission did not justify the modification of its draft on the basis of the subsidiarity principle. Some complained have raised from national parliaments on their effective power to control the use of the principle of subsidiarity. In fact the wording of the treaty explicitly mention “If reasoned opinions represent one third (one quarter in the area of freedom, security and justice) of the all the votes (each national Parliament shall have two votes), the draft must be reviewed. After such a review, the legislative initiator may decide to maintain, amend or withdraw the draft, but should motivate its decision.” (Article 7, Protocol 2 TEU). This last part of the article let the final decision to be in the hands of the EU legislators. The latest can freely decided to ignore the recommendation of the citizens representatives. This latest mention leads to the question : was the Early Warning System introduced as a make-up against the democratic deficit ? or was it meant to effectively involve national legislators, but avoiding a constant blockade by them ? was the Commission seen as more cooperative as it actually act now ?
source : European Commission Annual Reports on Relations Between the European Commission and National Parliament, from 2006 until 2017.
Secondly, the action of the national parliaments at the European level is not well known by its citizens. Those are not aware of the influence of EU policies in their national legal order, nor on the influence of national parliamentarians on EU legislation. This lack of awareness could come from a lack of communication between the parliaments and their mandators, or to the complexity of the policies involved. Yet, a better communication towards the citizens is essential. It would improve their understanding of the mechanisms at stake, and their understanding of the role of their deputies. They would, thus, be able to take these information into consideration during elections and have better representation of their opinion. It would also create an incentive for parliamentarians to get involved in the EU decision process, creating a better coordination between the citizens expectations and EU legislation. Therefore, what blocks the communication from national parliaments on their action in the EU decision-making process ? Finally, some parliaments are more involved in EU policies than others. National parliaments are making very different use of the political dialogue. Yearly, the 10 most active parliaments are sending 80% of all opinions. This unequal participation is rising an important question : are all EU citizens defend in the same manners ? If one day, these participation mechanisms become effective, will citizens of certain countries have more influence than others on the decision taken at the European level ? The reasons why some national parliaments get more involved than other stay today unclear. Some scholars argued than the level of contestation over EU integration, the level of division on the right-left scale, the level of integration of a country in a policy of the EU, or even the institutional capacity (budget, administration) of a parliaments had positive impact on their participation in the EU legislation-making process. Yet, what are the incentives to contribution rest confused. In a situation where a more substantial use of the political dialogue or the early warning system would be genuine, we need to insure the equal opportunity of all EU citizens in the influence of EU legislation.
By Mélanie Véron-Fougas – A 1st year Master student in European Governance at the Universities of Konstanz and Utrecht.
Throughout its many years of development, the EU can be considered an elite driven project of bureaucrats slowly but surely regulating and harmonizing legislation. Politicization, defined as “an increase in polarization of opinions, interests, or values and the extent to which they are publicly advanced towards the process of policy formulation within the EU” was low and normal citizens didn’t care so much for what happened far away in Brussels. From the 1990s onwards politicization has increased and Marks and Hooghe (two EU scholars) have used the theoretical framework of post-functionalism to explain how the EU has moved from a “permissive consensus to constraining dissensus”. Put simply: the EU was not made into a political issue for most citizens of Europe at first which allowed it to integrate by stealth. They claim that the EU has recently been made into a political issue by domestic actors thus constraining further integration. Marks and Hooghe have a negative conception of politicization: a strategy used by populists to regain national sovereignty, a means of slowing down integration or even reverting it. But can politicization also be a good thing? Can it, as some claim (and hope) lead to a truly open and frank discussion of values, which is what politics is all about? Is it just what the EU needs to legitimize political choices in a Europe of winners and losers or will it enable right-wing eurosceptics to destroy the very European Union itself? These are some of the questions I seek to address in this essay with the help of various perspectives put forward by EU scholars in the past.
Risks and Opportunities
Thomas Risse, a professor at the Freie Universität Berlin, is very clear in his stance regarding politicization: he sees it as a necessary way to tackle the democratic deficit with which the EU is confronted. His view combines politicization with the advent of various European public spheres in which EU policies must be discussed. This does not mean that EU politics should be more intensely discussed only on an European level. Instead it means that politicization “must go above and beyond the domestic politics of the member states.” and create a truly interconnected public sphere. Greater polarization of opinions also leads to more attention being paid to the European Union which would also increase “the psychological existence of Europe in people’s minds and, hence, facilitate identification processes.” The media and political elites have an active role to frame the European level as one in which the solutions to transnational problems should be found, as public spheres are likely to remain purely national otherwise.
Politicization can also have negative consequences for the European Union: Eurosceptic parties could increase their divisive rhetoric, without pro-European forces being united enough to effectively counter those messages. Secondly, politicization could lead to gridlock in Brussels which depends on finding large majorities. This is a problem because the EU depends for a large part of its legitimacy on the legislative output it produces. Lastly, a more political European Commission could lose its position as neutral policy actor and increasingly give countries leeway where there should be none. However, the likelihood of politicization to only be limited to Eurosceptic parties is slim and politicization does not necessarily have to lead to gridlock. Frank Schimmelfennig, in an interview with Europe Ahead also pointed to the positive aspects of a more political Commission: “The political role basically means that the Commission president is elected by a majority of the European Parliament which means it will be more politically influenced by what the Parliament wants and will have to tailor its policy making agenda in the European Parliament.”
Policy with Politics
A possible answer to the apparent decline in legitimacy of the European Union is found in political reform which aims at combining “policy with politics.” As Verdun noted, most of these proposals have as their aim to increase representative politics, mostly through increasing political competition in the European Parliament, the Commission and the Council. European democracy happens on multiple levels, and improvements on the European level alone will not suffice. Vivien Schmidt summarized the problem succinctly when she said that “while the EU makes policy without politics, given the marginalization of national partisan politics, its member states suffer from having politics without policy.” Whereas policy is increasingly being created on an European level, the democratic instruments have not sufficiently been created or empowered on a European level to represent the European demos/demoi.
Some academics like Simon Hix have repeatedly and forcefully argued for more politics within the European Union. The pareto-efficient, neo-functionalist policies which aimed at opening up the single market have transitioned into more redistributive policies with winners and losers. Such redistributive policies must be combined with actual European ideological political competition with winners and losers to legitimize them. More politics might be beneficial to the European polity and the power it has to “to overcome institutional gridlock, foster policy innovation, and increase accountability and legitimacy.”
The role of Farage
Could it be that anti-European populists like Farage also have their role to play in the coming of age of European democracy? I would argue that they represent the fears and anxieties of groups in Europe who have lost in the continuing market integration of the European Union. To completely ignore the opinion, fate and economic position of these people for whom the EU has not been a success story would be a mistake. It goes to the core of how a polity deals with disagreement, indeed “The essence of democratic politics is the very possibility of expressing disagreement.” Farage offers a safety valve to the discontent and grievance which has been building up (and has admittedly been cleverly mobilized by anti-EU parties) which could otherwise out itself in less democratic and more violent ways.
If politicization is going to contribute to the democratic public spheres which public sphere theorists aim for, both sides would have to want to honestly engage in deliberation on the basis of arguments. Deliberative democracy can only work when consensus is aimed for, which is not the case of sceptic anti-EU parties who want to abolish the entire institution they are elected for. Whether parties truly engage in constructive deliberation also depends on whether the speakers accept one another “as equal and legitimate contributors to public discourse”. What we often see is that actors delegitimize what the other side is saying through stereotyping or other rhetorical devices. Examples of such stereotyping may come in the form of anti-European parties like UKIP stereotyping EU bureaucrats as dictators, communists, oppressors and more. While such behaviour does increase the saliency of EU issues by generating media attention, it is not conducive to the creation of a political community. It is therefore important to make a differentiation in the kind of debate which is held about the EU in transnational public spheres: constructive and non-constructive forms. Debates about the EU in these public spheres could construct a “common sense of purpose and thus a community with which people can identify” but only when enough parties partaking in the discourse want it to be so.
Deliberative democracy and politicization are linked in the sense that it is hoped that politicization and more conflict expressed in the public sphere would lead to a “transmission of grievances to an empowered space, therefore guaranteeing the decisiveness of deliberation.” The hope that deliberation through rational argumentation, in a setting which honestly is looking for consensus and agreement, can solve the very problem of disagreement in politics is a fantasy as it disregards the fact that people “cannot be abstracted from their position in social and political power relations, language, cultural or other group belongings.” Citizens are constituted by their positions in these interlinking webs of social significance and the thought that deliberation can solve conflict on the basis of that is absurd. It will be useful in the future to structure conflict into a form of public contestation which is productive, instead of antagonistic, but does not resort to the a-political, consensus and efficiency focussed strategies employed throughout the past in the EU.
Conclusion
Politicization has many faces and whether or not it will turn out to be positive for European Integration also depends on its implementation. As Hix noted, “the politicization of the EU cannot be a mere and unproblematic reproduction of conflict lines at the national level.” Successful politicization within the European Union would then have to include a truly pan-European public sphere in which European Union institutions can frame and mobilize over transnational problems, instead of leaving problems up to the national level. When conflict is only structured nationally, “as in the case of national referenda over EU issues” this would lead to “the institutionalisation of disagreement (e.g. the granting of opt-outs) and the delegitimation of the EU”
If anything, recent crises have shown that there is nothing self-evident about the modern and enlightened vision many pro-EU supporters share. Instead of weakening the modernized and enlightened vision on the European Union, politicization and public contestation over the many political questions of our time could strengthen the European Union. If citizens are not given the capacity to know which office-holders are accountable for the “controversial issues at stake” then it might be that citizens are ”alienated from political participation, perhaps shifting to ‘ethno-nationalist’ confrontation.” To survive in a globally interconnected and interdependent world which has entered the digital era, the EU must find the strength to reforge its “Monnet method” of “Functional integration by stealth and depoliticized technocracy” into something which incorporates politics in a constructive manner and does justice to the democratic, liberal values which most people of the EU hold dear, a tough medicine which will be healthy for the future of the European polity in the end.
by Maarten Lemstra – A 1st year Master student in European Governance at the Universities of Konstanz and Utrecht.
Recently, the implementation of 5G in Europe has been at the forefront of newspapers. With new controversies or deadlines being met, it is well covered. From the controversy involving Huaweii, protests against potential dangers of the used radio waves or even the slow pace at which Europe is making progress on this issue, 5G has been well covered. What has been slightly less well covered, are the other areas that constitute Europe’s Digital Strategy. 5G has been one of the most visible european digitalisation policies. It is the high tech, speaks to the imagination of people, and allows it to compete in a field with the Americans and Chinese. However it is only part of the European Digital Strategy. Associated to it are other aspects. Aspects such as E-governance, Cybersecurity, Education and Business capabilities. These fields, equally important to the European Strategy have been less visible.
Europe established the Digital Single Market and Digitalisation as one of its top priorities. As Early as 2010, shortly after the entry into force of the Lisbon treaty, the Commission, tried to gain more powers in the area of digital policy. In concert with the council, targets were also set for member states to achieve. The targets, in 5 different fields, aimed at ensuring concentrated efforts, and the coordination of member states efforts. Efforts started very strongly. With many European states starting off strongly. However this trend has started to change over the last few years. While Nordic countries such as Finland and Estonia still perform well, many others have started to lag behind.
In the most recent progress reports, published mid June, the commission itself admits, that although progress has been made, it isn’t happening fast enough. The problems with the implementation of 5G technology are just one facet of the blocs general Digital Transformation goal. Many of these problems stem out different priorities for the member states. Although it has many benefits for most governments, it isn’t high on the agenda in most countries. In Belgium for example, although the government started with ambitious plans of becoming a European Digital leader, progress has stalled. In fact it has stalled to such an extent that the Commission took Belgium to court over the slow transposition of European directives on the Digital market.
A strong digital Europe has many advantages for everyone. It would greatly improve accessibility to government services, generating opportunities for people with the use of the internet, and provide a boost to european companies. A first step would be to ensure national interests in these topics. Without the will of member states to contribute, change is not really possible. One core area where more can be achieved is the Human Capital one. Only 60 percent of European have basic software skills, and are more competent than that. When it comes to ICT skills, the number decreases to a mere 3 percent of the population. Although not everyone has to be trained in these skills, allowing for more capabilities building in those areas, will drastically improve the opportunities given to certain parts of the population. It could allow for more social mobility, and provide a new impetus for people to create new European digital ideas.
A similar change can be made in e-governance. When looking at the numbers, there seems to be an advantages given to e-governance services for businesses. While only relatively small, it is still significant. Furthermore, E-health seems to only have lag behind as well. Although much progress has been made, going up 10% in the last few years, only 18% of individuals in Europe seem to use it. For services that can be important for saving lives, more effort can be put into it.
Arguably, already much has been achieved. Many more people are now connected to the internet, with faster internet than 10 years ago. Many businesses are a lot more integrated into new technologies, and make more use of the internet. Yet still many problems remain. In Southern Germany, large areas are without connectivity. Taking the train in Baden Wurttemberg, I have all to often found myself without service, even when my train had been cancelled or running late.
Having internet, although seemingly a luxury today, has become an important part of daily life. From planning your trip, shopping or making a quick search, it has become a commodity that is used in almost all circumstances. Ensuring that services are readily available should be an important priority for all member states. Not just because it brings many advantages for the individual, but because it will bring a large boost to the economies of all member states. Having a modern and digital economy, will allow for stronger competition, create more jobs, and create opportunities for the individual. The digital single market has already brought a lot of wealth and advancement to Europe, but it should be pushed further. A modern economy, using all the technologies currently on offer will not just benefit Europe as a while, but also individual member states. They should strive to maximise its potential.
By Misha Stocker – A 1st year Master student in European Governance at the Universities of Konstanz and Utrecht.
In October 2018, the manifesto “My Body, My Rights”, published in “Le Nouvel Observateur”, called for equal sexual and reproductive rights for all women in Europe. Abortion legislations are currently regulated at the national level and no common framework exists in the European Union. This situation creates huge inequalities among European women. If some countries have known improvements over the past years, such as the abolition of the abortion ban in Ireland, some others, and sadly the majority of them, have known some alarming backlashes. The Polish government attempts to restrict even more the already narrow conditions under which abortion is legal; in Italy 70% of the doctors are using a conscience clause in order to refuse the practice of abortion, creating unrealistic waiting lists and delays in the public service and favouring the private practitioners. Other countries, not to mention Germany, do not officially restrict abortion per se, but reduce the access to information, leaving women in desperate situations, instead of guiding them toward the best options concerning their personal situations.
Sexual and Reproductive Health Rights (SRHR) are considered under the frame of gender equality and access to health, which provides the EU with limited competencies. Various official reports of Institutions highlight the lack of consensus among Member States on the topic. Yet, European legislative bodies seem more willing to implement a supranational framework on SRHR, especially regarding abortion rights. In 2001, the European Parliament encouraged greater access to SRHR among the Member States, including the existence of “legal, safe and accessible” abortion. More recently in 2013, the Council of Ministers signed a common declaration encouraging the implementation of the Beijing Platform of Action. This Platform represents the international legal argument to defend abortion rights, stating that “reproductive health […] implies that people […] have the capability to reproduce and the freedom to decide if, when and how often to do so” (para. 94). In fact, limiting access to abortion reduces peoples’ rights to have control over their own body and their rights to have a familly if, when and how they want it.
Moreover, restricted access to abortion does not eliminate the practice but creates an incentive for illegal procedures to happen, therefore increasing insecurity. For instance, in the case of Poland, every year, around 1 100 legal abortions are practiced, but between 80 000 and 150 000 are still made under illegal circumstances. Fortunately, scientific advancements give women more possibilities to (il)legally terminate their pregnancy other than the use of a cloth hanger. Abortive pills can either be ordered and shipped from abroad when is it still possible, or pregnant women have to travel in a foreign country, or find a doctor that practices it illegally, or in worst case scenarios, do it at home in dangerous and unhealthy conditions. As the statistics show, in Poland, restricting abortions rigths do not prevent its practice. It just makes it more dangerous and uncontrolled. Therefore, why does the legislation persevere to limit this right instead of helping the people in those situations and giving them access to safe and controlled healthcare ?
NO, women having recourse to abortion do not do it for pleasure. NO, abortion is not used as a contraceptive. And NO, abortion is not easy. Legalising abortion, and making it solely a woman’s choice, is offering women in desesperate situations an alternative to their unwanted pregancy. Abortion has to be made accessible by the state and accompanied by professionals. Yet, some European legislation are depriving women of their rights to information. This is the case of the paragraph 219a of the German Penal Code. The article states that no information related to abortion can to be made public. In 2016, the doctor Kristina Hänel was fined 6 000 € because she indicated on her website that she was practicing abortion for her patients. Her trial provoked a public debate over this article, dating back from 1933. A new version was passed in February 2019, allowing doctors to say on their website that they are practicing abortion. Yet, no further information can be provided and in June this year, two nurses were fined because they added that abortion was practiced “in a safe environment”. When women are finding themselves in a situation of unwanted pregnancy, they have to be able to find neutral and reliable information on their options, and information has to be easily and quickly accessible.
If it is important to provide women with reliable and available information, and it is equally important to guide them over the entire process. A report requested by the European Parliament Committee on Women’s rights and gender equality identified only two countries in Europe having legal dispositions supervising post-abortion care. Those consist in psychological and social support and councelling sessions before and after abortion. I do not say that every woman needs psychological support before and after abortion, yet, such an event is never painless and easy, therefore, women should be offered the possibility to be adequately and professionaly supported.
Another problem identified in Europe is the ineffective implementation of abortion rights. In most countries, doctors have the right to refuse the practice of abortion, using a conscience clause. So be it. Yet, such clauses, when they are used by the majority of doctors, create situations in which it becomes hard to access one’s rights. It is reported that in Italy, 70% of doctors are using this conscience clause, creating inadmissible delay to have an abortion once they found a doctor willing to deliver them a required certificate. In 2014, almost 15% of Italian women had to wait more than 21 days, and regular testimonies report that they almost missed the legal time limit due to these delays. This is why it is important to legalise abortion, it is equally important to ensure an effective access to it.
Additionally, it is also crucial to provide adequate training to gynecologists. Taking the case of Italy once again, only 15% of the doctors are using the conscience clause for religious reasons. Most of them report a lack a knowledge and training. They have to declare if they will be conscientious objectors at the beginning of their studies, and if so do not learn how to practice it. In Germany this is not taught at university. The 1 200 doctors still practicing it today have learned it 40 years ago, creating a worrying situation for the years to come. The least that could be done, would be to teach medicine students that can after decide if they want or not to practice it.
As a reminder, the UN Human Rights Committee ruled that any lack of access to abortion was considered as a cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. AND IT IS. It denies the right to women to have full control over their own body, shaming them and, forcing them to find unwanted alternatives, and therefore creating dangerous situations, instead of providing them with optimal care. All these reasons should be sufficient to justify a common European framework legalising abortion, making it effectively accessible, safe, and free.
By Mélanie Véron-Fougas – A 1st year Master student in European Governance at the Universities of Konstanz and Utrecht.
European policy-making regarding immigration has been increasing in the last decades. The Schengen agreement and the set-up of the of the European agency Frontex for instance, are examples of how the European Union is involved in this field. Especially the controversial deal with Turkey in 2016 could be seen as a far-reaching example of how the EU is decisive in the area of immigration. When it comes to a field which is closely linked to immigration however, the area of policies on integration of immigrants, European involvement is less visible or extensive. As formulating integration-policies is not an EU-competence, the room for manoeuvre for European action is seemingly small. It remains rather limited to a supportive and coordinative role towards the individual Member States (MS), which decide themselves how migrants should be integrated into their societies. European action can take multiple forms however. In this blog, before some general remarks, I want to address two instances in which the EU is active with regard to integration of immigrants in Europe.
First of all, integration is not an easy process; building a bridge between a receiving society and incoming immigrants can be a tough two-way road. Therefore, formulating an effective and social integration policy is a challenging task for an individual country. To make things more difficult, integration as a concept inevitably deals with national identity. Before questioning how a migrant becomes a national, a country first has to ask itself what it means to be a national living in the country. Arguably, this provides a reason for European MS to protect their national competence of integration policies. Why should the EU decide how people are fitting into their national societies? Integration of immigrants is therefore characterized as a sensitive policy area.
Overall MIPEX scores European countries (2014)
Luckily, not all debates about competences regarding integration policies are constrained by such cultural and national identity-arguments. In practice, the EU is able to use ‘soft governance’ in the field of integration of immigrants. For instance, Europe provides a useful platform for sharing and comparing best-practices on policies for integration. One of those tools is the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), sponsored by the EU. This tool measures integration policies and outcomes in 38 countries, using 167 indicators to give scores about how well migrants are integrated in the respective countries. Scores are for example based on the degree in which immigrants find access to the labour market, receive education and are politically participating in the respective countries. This tool also provides a comparing-device, as it gives the opportunity to ‘name and shame’ MS who are failing to integrate migrants in an effective manner.
In addition to European platforms regarding immigrant integration policies, the EU also plays a more substantive role, for instance with the fund of Asylum, Migration and Integration (AMIF). The budget of this fund is not insignificant, with a total of 6.6 billion euros for the years 2014-2020. All EU member states of the EU except for Denmark, are able to receive money from this fund to effectively integrate migrants into their societies. This is necessary sometimes, as there are MS which are not reserving money themselves for initiating effective integration policies. Poland for instance, a country with a relatively low proportion of immigrants to the total population, has no “dedicated national integration strategy”. This is revealed in their MIPEX score, with an overall rank of Poland of 32 (out of 38 countries). This specific case shows in my opinion the added value of the European AMIF fund. It is able to provide some degree of basic integration policy, even in countries with no existing national integration policies like Poland. Therefore, the AMIF could help immigrants coming to Europe finding their place in a new society.
At the moment, there exists a gap between strong
and decisive European policies in the field of immigration, and soft European
action in the field of integration. Whether this gap needs to be filled is a difficult
question, but European cooperation regarding the integration of immigrants proves
to be important in my view.
by Tim Draijer – A 1st year Master student in European Governance at the Universities of Konstanz and Utrecht.
Just after the European Parliament elections, two editors of the Europe Ahead blog met up with Prof. dr. Frank Schimmelfennig to discuss the past, present and future of the European Union. Frank Schimmelfennig is a professor in European Politics at the ETH Zurich, one of the leading universities in the world, and is one of the most prominent scholars in the field of European Integration studies.
Reflecting on the European Parliament elections: What do you think of the outcomes of the recent elections of the European Parliament?
My take on it is that the EU has benefited overall from the elections, for instance by the larger turnout which strengthened the overall legitimacy. Inside the European Parliament (EP), the cartel has been broken up, but it did so without weakening the mainstream parties. The loss of the Social Democrats and the European’s People Party have been compensated by wins of the Liberals and the Greens, but this fragmentation of the EP requires more effort to form new coalitions.
Do you see this fragmentation as a bad thing?
No, I don’t think it is a bad thing, because it mirrors what happens all around Europe. Much of the former issues of the EP have been due to oversized party groups, which were functioning as a large tent for other parties. The conflict with Orban, for instance, can be seen as an opportunity to sharpen a new profile.
How do you think the power of the European Parliament will change after this elections, also in relation with the Spitzenkandidaten process?
The fact is now that for a stable legislative majority inside the EP, you need at least four party groups. There has been a broad empowerment of the EP, but one has to be clear of what the EP can do: it is not the engine of change inside the European Union. As long as you have a blockage in the Council of Ministers, the EP cannot overcome this. Regarding the Spitzenkandidaten process, the principle itself has been established and will be hard to ignore. Furthermore, when it comes to the chances of one of the Spitzenkandidaten, Manfred Weber, he will also need a broader coalition of 4 groups. His chances therefore largely depend on how he finds support from the Liberals and Greens. In addition, he will have to make big promises. What worked well last time was the swift rally inside the EP, as they would not accept any other candidate proposed by Council. The process is more open this time and Weber’s success will depend on the coherence of the EPP and the commitment of the other parties to the Spitzenkandidaten principle.
Personal questions
Why did you choose the field of European politics?
I have been trained as an International Relations scholar specialized in Eastern Europe. When I first started my PhD, I wanted to focus on the Soviet Union. Basically, before I started doing research, the Soviet Union ceased to exist so that I had to find something else. As I wanted to remain in the field of European politics I chose to specialize in Eastern European politics. A big research issue during these years, was how new institutional structures were formed in the new context after the Cold War.
Looking back, are you satisfied with your choice?
Yes. At that time socialization had been understudied, the relatively scarce work on that topic was deeply a-theoretical, therefore I was able to bring some IR tools. I think it worked well, my work on enlargement, conditionality and socialization has been a stepping stone in my career. My interest of becoming a researcher developed during my studies, as I got really fond of theory and methodology.
How have your experiences abroad improved your view of the European project?
For instance. a major advantage of living in Switzerland, is that I can now see the EU from outside, there is a different discourse there than in Germany. The German view of EU is largely affected by its post-war identity, never only as cost-benefit analysis because the European integration is part of German reconstruction after the war. It was a major anchor for democratizing and rehabilitating the country. The Swiss people see the EU as utterly pragmatic, as they already have democracy and wealth, so they feel that they need to integrate only so far as they need. Working in Switzerland was helpful to develop the differentiated integration theory where I was able to look at the EU as a project which can integrate to various degrees, based on a number of factors like wealth and identity.
The Concept of Differentiated Integration
Regarding this concept, is there no danger of cherry picking where MS integrate only in the policy fields they like?
I think there is always an incentive for cherry picking, but I think the EU core is strong enough to prevent that. In the UK negotiations for instance, the EU has had a firmly negotiation position. Bit the same in the case with Switzerland: there is always an incentive to cherry pick, but the EU has made clear that for instance the European internal market comes with obligations, for example by paying some money for cohesion. A big domestic issue is about the institutional framework agreement in Switzerland, but it is a side issue in the rest of Europe. Here I think the market and bargaining power of EU is large enough to prevent cherry picking.
Is there no threat of a large increase in complexity with the concept of differentiated integration?
This danger exists, but I think it’s a trade-off. If you would like to have a ‘clear’ EU, there would be less integration. In addition, the possibility of increasing complexity is not a very big concern for me; when it comes to the institutions the EU has maintained quite a uniform core. For instance, according to some people, it would be best if the EP was differentiated into a normal parliament and a Eurozone parliament: this is not happening I think. Furthermore, a large number of MS are integrated in all policy areas at the ‘highest’ EU policy level, which provides a large numerical core.
What do you think if some MS want to integrate more and more, where others do not?
First of all, if and when the UK leaves, the EU will be more uniformly integrated in any sense. The UK has been the ‘champion of differentiated integration’ for a very long time. Second, as the Brexit will put pressure on smaller MS, that have been hiding behind the UK, to integrate further. In addition, there are strong interests that prevent an overshoot of differentiated integration. Macron for instance, wants to move ahead, where for instance Eastern European countries don’t. France can only differentiate the EU further with Germany, but Germany moderates this as it has important economic ties with the central European countries who are less in favour of more integration. France therefore can not push the agenda alone: all in all, differentiation will be slower.
Regarding the Western Eastern divide: do you think there will be more convergence of characteristics of the Member States, also for instance in the relation between religion and politics?
I think that in order to say something about this topic, one has to really dive into the different national histories. From the perspective of modernization, the eastern European countries have been lagging behind, but secularization is even taking hold of Poland. One instance in which divergence and differentiation are bothersome, however, is fundamental values and the rule of law. Independent institutions have been one of the basic foundations of the EU. In some countries, like Hungary and Poland, however, the preservation of this foundation is under pressure. On the other side, when it comes to the protection of fundamental values in Eastern European countries, we see the rise of the anti-corruption movement, for instance in Romania.
What is your take on the movement of Eastern European youth towards the richer Western European countries?
That is a true dilemma. The EU is about creating freedoms and opening borders, but not to the benefit of everyone. Educated elites of Eastern European countries for instance, have gained a lot from European integration, where other people did not. When those educated, open-minded elites leave their country, they will not be able to affect the political development of their home-countries. Related to this, one can say that right wing populism in countries is not only driven by immigration but also largely by fears of emigration. It is the combination of emigration and immigration that makes populists fight against migration.
The role of the EU outside Europe
How do you see the future of globalisation, and international cooperation?
First of all, I think that the heyday of globalisation is over! What we see now is stagnation, or even slowballisation. We observe stagnation of trade and receding capital movements.This might be a result of the global financial crisis and Trumpian politics as they have put a break on globalization. I think it depends on a lot of developments. While the worst of the financial crisis is over, we have not seen a return on transnational dependence levels which were observed before. As the China and U.S. trade war continues, we now live in a time in which the EU should not only think about how to integrate itself in a globalized world economy, but also how it will hold its place in this worsening economic climate.
Do you see a leading role of the EU in the field of climate change?
It is one thing what the EU does inside of Europe; here I think it can still do a lot on climate change. But I think that outside Europe, the EU’s potential for a leading role is quite limited. There exist many examples of trendsetter role of the EU: for instance when it comes to consumer rights. However, without the backing of policies on climate change in China and the U.S., I don’t think the EU has a very important role to play in this field. In addition, I think the issue really is here that this problem of climate change is simply to big for the EU to tackle alone, and to move ahead decisively.
In general, do you see the EU as a normative or more as an economic power?
To start, seeing the EU as a normative power is a very 1990s concept; in that time this view couldn’t be blamed, following processes of increasing democratization and integration. In the 21st century, however, I think the EU lost that normative power during the migration and Euro crisis. Thereby the outside attractiveness of EU as an international cooperation model has also been suffering. Initially, the normative power idea of the EU was that it would be a shining example of a new type of international relations. You might argue that the whole idea has been a bit too rosy a picture. Even in the 1990’s what really made European integration go, was the economy, and not human rights.
Crises in Europe
The media often gives us the impression that there is always a crisis to deal with whereas a majority of people living in Europe are enjoying a good life with more wealth and liberty than ever before, what do you think about this?
I think for the moment the worst is over, people are recovering, and are having a more optimistic view, also of the EU. If you look at the latest eurobarometer, the EU has never been as popular since 1992. It has really rebounded in public opinion well. I think that this crisis narrative still is important, and the famous quote of Jean Monnet
“Europe will be forged in crises, and will be the sum of the solutions adopted for those crises”
Jean Monnet
is partly vindicated by what happened during the crisis. In retrospect we can clearly see that two of the major projects which the EU has been driving forward in the 1990s, the Euro and Schengen, were really built on very shallow foundations, being really fair weather integration projects. What Jean Monnet said is going to happen because governments have to find a consensus but when a crisis comes they will understand what they have in the EU. They will understand that they will be worse off disintegrating and they are better off fixing the issues. To some extent the Eurozone has done this, not fully, there will be future crisis and there will be future fixes but I think everyone in the Eurozone has understood there is no way of going back and we have to work constructively towards consolidating the eurozone, because the interdepence is so strong. Interestingly this did not happen in the Schengen zone as the interdependence is much lower and the cost of disintegration is lower too. It is like Jean Monnet said, it is the risks of disintegration which actually keep countries moving forward. It is not a deep conviction that we have to build Europe, but it is really a way to solve day to day issues.
That seems like its a positive thing to you, the slow way that the EU has been integrating is through crisis. Is it the right way forward or should the EU also look further ahead rather than just looking at issues on their path at a certain moment?
The argument I just made is in line with this failing forward idea, you build something, it fails, you have a problem, you fix it, not particularly well and you fix it again. It is the old neofunctionalist idea, incrementalism and spillover: it’s all in there. If you ask me, it’s a very costly way, only learning through crisis instead of building the institutions right from the beginning. Just think of the sufferings we could have spared the Greek or the Spanish if we had gotten the institutions right from the beginning,
Recently, Luuk van Middelaar wrote a book about how improvisation plays a major part on the EU level, would you agree with this?
It depends on whether you talk about the EU in normal routine mode or crisis mode. We have long had that technical, incremental development but then when the crisis hits and regimes break down and you need to move into crisis mode in the EU council and improvisation to deal with issues that regular policy routines can not deal with. I think for me this is not a fundamental distinction.
Democracy and the EU
What do you think about creating some sort of a stronger link between national parliaments and European policy making to stop national parliaments from saying “everything good is because of us, everything bad is because of them”?
It is not only what national parliaments do, it is also what national governments do too. I mean, we have to be very clear of the tradeoffs that this has. On the one hand it would give national parliaments a stake in EU politics, and I think there are many MS where this is underdeveloped, even though there are member states this is very well developed and also functions rather well. But if it goes to the point that national parliaments obtain a veto in EU policy making it would basically lead to a paralysis Just think of the eurozone crisis with every national parliament having a veto on the rescue measures, the Eurozone would have fallen apart. National parliaments are often more Eurosceptic than national governments and they are also keener on keeping national positions which governments in negotiations have to find compromises on. One has to be careful what to wish for.
What is often criticized is that you can only vote inside the country on national parties during European Parliament elections, would it be good to vote for European parliamentarians as well, to have transnational lists?
Yes, I think that would be a good idea, and I was deeply disappointed that the European Parliament itself said we would not have it.I think in the very beginning I think that it is more something that cosmopolitan elites are fond of, but I think it will create a dynamic. It will not mean that transnational lists will actually take over, but having this opportunity would be very nice and of course both the European Council and national parties will be very much against it. National parties want to keep their control over national parliamentarians, it will be a difficult fight but it should definitely be something that the European Parliament should push for. I would have expected the European Council to fight against this, but I was disappointed that some in the European Parliament actually joined this resistance. And what we of course also need to have is a right for legislative initiative for the Parliament.
Theorising about reality
There exist many lenses to explain EU integration. How do we deal with this plurality of theoretical perspectives?
I think it makes our perspectives on the European Union a lot richer if we keep this theoretical pluralism and the fact that the theoretical pluralism has survived also tells you that there is no single theory that explains everything. Of course that shouldn’t produce an attitude of “anything goes”. I think that in each of the cases we have to test theories quite rigorously and we have to really make an effort to see which theory gives us the best handle on specific cases or patterns. I think that the EU and EU integration is such a complex and multifaceted process that a single theory will not capture everything and it should not, because if a theory captures everything it also captures nothing.
Is there a strong enough link between the insights professors like you find on what is the best way to move forward and the real integration taking place in the EU?
I don’t see myself in the business of making recommendations on how the EU should move forwards…
The policy makers reading this blog will be very disappointed to hear…
Haha, yes but what we as academics should focus on first and foremost is providing sound explanations of what has happened, you can only build sound recommendations for the future if you have a very good understanding of how things have happened in the past and this is where I see my role as academic, provide to the extent possible methodologically rigorous analysis of processes of European integration, also testing causal inferences of policies that work or don’t work also in order to say “be careful, this might be a normatively desirable policy but there are many issues with how it will be put into practice.”
Brexit
People often blame Theresa May for messing things up, but too what extent has she been given a poisoned chalice? To what extent is the messup of Brexit blameable on Theresa May as a person and too which extent on the structural condition of her negotiating position which was terrible.
I read a quote a long time ago, from some British parliamentarian which I thought was fitting, “It is very difficult to see how anyone else but Theresa May should really have provided a smooth ride to brexit, but it is also difficult to see how anyone could have messed it up any more badly than she did.” I think it has always been a very difficult negotiation from the very beginning because there have been too many illusions on the side of the brexiteers of what would be possible in the negotiations with the EU. I also think that Theresa May has made it even worse by formulating too strong red lines from the beginning and not being flexible on exploring issues, on alternative coalitions and alternative ways of brexit until it was basically too late and the camps were too entrenched.
How negative are you about a no-deal scenario, which is getting more likely by the day?
If there is anything that the House of Commons (HoC) can agree upon it is that we will not have a no-deal, it does not have a positive agenda but it is very strong on avoiding this negative outcome. As long as you don’t have a second referendum or new elections, but the same constellation in the house of commons I think it will do all it can to prevent the no-deal scenario. We would have to wait for either fresh-elections or a new referendum to see where this is moving. If it was going to happen, all models that we have predict that a no-deal Brexit will be the solution that does the most harm to the UK. This is also why we have this anti-Brexit coalition in the HoC.
The future of the EU
How would you think the EU will develop over the coming years?
Looking back on the last twenty years what we have seen in EU integration is a huge expansion of policies and members, it’s a huge process of opening up borders and what we are now in is a phase of correction, consolidation, contraction, where the focus will be on consolidating what we have rather than moving ahead. It is a bit like breathing in and breathing out. The post-cold war era is one in which the EU has expanded in all kinds of different directions and in a certain way it has over-extended, gone too far. The shallow foundations have been revealed in these crises, so what we will see is a period in which I don’t think the internal boundaries of the EU will be renationalized but I think that we will see a process in which the external boundaries of the EU will be consolidated. We will not see major enlargement. We will see a hardening of Europe’s borders, more emphasis on border protection. This is the one thing that mainstream parties and populists can agree on, a kind of a common agenda: we have to safeguard the common borders and curb migration. We will not open up further towards non-member states, that is going to be the movement in which the EU is going.
Breathing in and breathing out made me think of the standard economic view of how different economies develop, which also occurs with a sinus curve, how do you see the future, is it like this curve, sometimes expanding and sometimes consolidating, but with an upward trajectory?
I mean, if you look back at the history of EU integration it has started really small, it has ran into a period of stagnation in the 60 and 70s, freed itself from that stagnation by opening up hugely towards the outside world, integrating with the globalizing world economy and enlarging into new member states. I think now is on the agenda is not a period of retrenchment but a period of consolidation and strengthening the foundations. Making the EU ready for the next step. For now I think a lot of work will be put in and has to be put in consolidating the institutions and correcting some of the overstretch.
Are these future challenges not something which requires more Europe. What would you say to those who say “we need to integrate more”?
In certain areas the EU needs to move ahead, but this is not the current mood now. I think it would also be wise for the next 5 years to say “lets consolidate what we have, let’s prevent disintegrating and moving back”. There are many good signs: even many right-wing populist parties understand, that calling for exit, calling for the disruption or the abandoning of the EU is not popular with the people, will not help the MS, some Dutch parties are behind the learning curve. They will learn it the hard way, so I think that the EU is on a very good path to consolidate, also to make the sceptics part of the system, rather than forces for exit. Also Macron’s motto “the Europe that protects” is very much in line with where the EU needs to go. Of course there will be these cyclical changes at some point, there will be some point like in the 1980s where people will understand that too much protection, too much consolidation will also limit the opportunities that the EU will have but I think this is something for the future, first of all what we see is more effort in consolidation.
Personal advice
As a last question, do you have any advice, perhaps personal, for students in this field or researchers living in the EU?
Benefit from the opportunities, see what you have, engage with the EU and with elections. Many bad decisions have been taken because young educated people have not bothered to vote or not bothered to engage and I think it is quite clear that these people benefit from the EU the most and would also lose the most if they leave their votes to others.
By Tim Draijer & Maarten Lemstra – 1st year Master students in European Governance at the Universities of Konstanz and Utrecht.
Two centuries after international efforts started to end slavery around the world, it is hard to name any state that still actively and purposefully violates article 4 of the Universal declaration of Human Rights on the prohibition of slavery and forced labour. Finding such a state that is at least partially supported by the international community is even harder. But it does exist. Namely Eritrea, sometimes referred to as the “North Korea of Africa”. Eritrea, is situated on the shore of the vital sea lane of the Red Sea in the Horn of Africa, and consequently is of geopolitical relevance. Multiple countries, including Israel and the UAE have military bases on its territory. Eritrea is also an ally of Saudi Arabia in its war in Yemen, and is forging closer ties to Russia. More importantly however, the EU has promised to invest 20 million into the country to improve the local infrastructure.
Ordinarily, a development aid scheme of building roads in one of Africa’s poorest countries would not be regarded as problematic. Especially not coming from an entity such as the EU. It spends billions on development every year, and 20 million is a small drop in the ocean of international cooperation. Additionally, development aid has often been used to create a good climate for other political and economic objectives, such as improved trade. The stated aims of the project are also not radical. The money is meant to create better access to the sea and to harbours. The project aims to dissuade migration from the Eritrea by creating more economic opportunities.
The problem in this case is the use of forced labour in a project implemented by the EU with the Eritrean regime. The record of the Eritrean government – a direct partner in this project, is a matter of serious contention. Year after year, the UN Security Council, the UN Human Rights Council and Special UN rapporteurs have described the dire state of systematic and severe Human rights violations in the country. Ranging from high ranking military officials being engaged in human trafficking, the near total control of the state of any economic and cultural activity or the fact that the state conscripts the majority of its citizens into an indefinite military service. It is a practice that the UN has described as forced labour and enslavement. The National Service, as this is called, is used for a multitude of tasks, and the conscripts do the brunt of all labour in the country. No infrastructure project in Eritrea is possible without it. The European Union admits it is going to use that workforce in its policy action fiche, published when it announced the investment. The European project plans, therefore, show serious flaws in European policy making. The result is a squandering of Europe’s greatest asset: the high standards it upholds.
Policy-wise, the EU is indirectly funding and enabling forced labour in slave-like conditions. 20 million has been granted to a project which cannot be implemented without the use of forced labour. The project plan informs about the use of three forms of labour, all of which appear to fall under the National Service conditions. Although the EU has attached conditions on this funding such as the relaxation of the national service or the release of political prisoners, these conditions are not sufficient to end forced labour or prevent its use in this project. As for the conditionality, these conditions have been agreed to in the past in exchange for development funding or related to the loosening of sanctions posed upon the country. Results have yet to materialise, and there is no indication that the Eritrean government will comply this time round. Yet, even with some pre-conditions that have a chance of success, I find it highly problematic that the EU would fund a regime that according to the UN practices state-sponsored slavery. The EU is supposed to set standards, not weaken them. The EU is supposed to uphold those values. The EU should be a torch-bearer for Human Rights. Having even one single policy that undermines basic Human Rights sets a dangerous precedent, one that cannot be accepted. Protecting Human Rights, good governance and the rule of law are essential elements of European legitimacy. May it be at home in Europe or abroad, the EU must be an example. For if it does not, why have a value-based European Union at all? And if we do not have a value-based Europe, what do we then stand for?
There is an argument to be made for hardcore realism in international relations. That values, democracy and Human Rights matter little, and that instead one should be pragmatic in trying to achieve interests. In fact, an entire school in international relations is dedicated to this paradigm. Yet, the EU should avoid the temptation of this logic. It would go against the very essence of what the EU stands for and undermine its identity. Within the Lisbon treaty, it is clearly stated that the EU’s action shall be guided by the standards and values that have led to its own creation. These are Democracy, the Rule of Law and respect for Human Rights. It is important for the EU to continue to uphold and spread these values, because it is at the basis of the Union’s legitimacy. Out of the ashes of the Second World War, a United Europe was born. A Europe that solemnly promised to ensure that the horrors of war would never be experienced again. A Europe that declared it would break from its past.
Tank Graveyard near Asmara
Equally, there is an argument to be made for pragmatism. That the EU should not demand absolute compliance with Human Rights but progress towards their realisation. That it should be used as a way forward to enable cooperation, which remains crucially important in this interdependent world. Equally, the EU should consider its own interest and protect these. Whether towards a peaceful neighbourhood, or the unity of the Union. However, such considerations are not mutually exclusive. While compliance with Human Rights to European standards can be weighted, compliance with the most basic ones, such as forced labour and slavery can never be traded. In our modern world, the abomination of slavery should be a given, and it should never be used as a bargaining chip. We should also not forget that the association of the EU with its founding values of Democracy, the Rule of Law and Human Rights is its key asset. It increases European power and influence abroad. While many African countries have accepted support from China in recent years, there has been much discontent with this new partner. Few results but increased corruption has started to create opposition to the Chinese development model. Their no-strings attached investment, has propped up dictatorial regimes and created anger and resentment in the local population. With a value-based approach, the EU can build stronger and more sustainable ties. Ties that allow it to protect its own national interests, while creating new alliances.
Currently the EU can still maintain that it is inextricably tied with the values that spearheaded its foundation. This is crucial. This approach has increased European soft power considerably. Soft power has given Europe influence beyond its borders. In the absence of a European army or a single European Foreign Policy, it is Europe’s most potent way of influencing international relations. Europe should be careful to not create its own Vietnam, tarnishing its image, and losing the good will of many. Following the Vietnam-war and later the Iraq-war, the United States became increasingly seen as self-serving. It is not isolated, but many now distrust it and seek alternatives.
The EU should not fall into the trap of undermining the very values on which it is based. There is no doubt that this project in Eritrea is detrimental to Europe’s image. It is a mistake. The EU should be pragmatic, but it should be so in a broader sense. It should be an example of good governance and human rights standards. The EU should also keep eye on the future. It should build relationships based on goodwill and cooperation, underpinned by the values it stands for.
By Misha Stocker – A 1st year Master student in European Governance at the Universities of Konstanz and Utrecht.
Europe Ahead 